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Sommario
L’ Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) e` il servizio atto a garantire
che la capacita` del sistema di trasporto aereo venga sempre rispettata ed
utilizzata in maniera efficiente. A tale scopo vengono impiegate una serie di
misure che spaziano da quelle strategiche a lungo termine fino all’imposizione
di ritardi a terra ad un livello tattico. Questi ritardi ATFM sono imposti indi-
vidualmente, sotto forma di slot, ai singoli voli prima del decollo presso il loro
aeroporto di partenza, poiche` l’anticipazione a terra di qualsivoglia ritardo
previsto nel sistema, implica un costo inferiore ed una maggiore sicurezza.
Tali ritardi vengono assegnati da un’autorita` centrale in base ad un prin-
cipio First-Planned-First-Served, senza prendere in considerazione le prefe-
renze individuali delle compagnie aeree. Tale criterio di assegnazione puo`
implicare un costo aggregato agli utenti maggiore di quello minimo, dal mo-
mento che il costo del ritardo e` legato da una funzione non-lineare alla durata
del ritardo stesso e dipende da molte altre variabili quali il tipo di velivolo,
la specifica coppia origine-destinazione, ecc.
Questa tesi affronta il problema della formalizzazione ed analisi di mo-
delli alternativi per l’assegnazione di risorse ATFM, che tengano conto delle
preferenze individuali delle compagnie aeree. In particolare vengono analiz-
zati modelli di programmazione matematica che estendono il concetto di slot
ATFM correntemente impiegato, a quello di Target Window proposto dal
progetto europeo CATS. Tale concetto e` in linea con il programma SESAR,
recentemente adottato dalla Commissione Europea per sviluppare il sistema
di Air Traffic Management di nuova generazione, il quale impone un coin-
volgimento diretto degli utenti (le compagnie aeree) ogniqualvolta debbano
essere imposte delle limitazioni esterne, che modifichino le richieste originali.
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Il primo capitolo fornisce un’introduzione generale al contesto dell’Air
Traffic Management e del controllo del traffico aereo. Nel secondo capitolo
vengono descritti i principi, i metodi e le performances del sistema di ATFM
sia in base all’organizzazione attuale sia in accordo con il concetto SESAR.
In seguito viene descritto matematicamente il problema dell’assegnazione
ottima di risorse ATFM e successivamente viene analizzato per rilevare due
strutture fondamentali che ne determinano la trattabilita`: la prima cor-
risponde al caso in cui ci sia un’unica risorsa capacitata, mentre la seconda
include il caso in cui vi sia un generico numero di risorse capacitate.
Nel capitolo tre vengono dimostrate una serie di proprieta` che permettono
di studiare l’applicabilta` di diversi meccanismi per il calcolo centralizzato
della soluzione ottima da parte di un’autorita` centrale. Tali meccanismi
vengono formulati come particolari tipi di aste, gli scambi, dal momento che
richiedono la minimizzazione di un costo a cui sono soggette entita` distinte
e che permettono contemporaneamente a ciascun partecipante di acquistare
e vendere differenti beni indivisibili.
L’ultima parte della tesi inclusa nel capitolo quattro tratta la proget-
tazione di meccanismi di scambio iterativi, la cui applicazione reale presenta
diversi vantaggi rispetto all’adozione di modelli centralizzati, dalla distribu-
zione della complessita` computazionale tra i partecipanti, alla preservazione
della privacy riguardo alle informazioni degli operatori aerei. In questo caso
viene dapprima formulato ed analizzato un modello basato sul rilassamento
lagrangiano del problema centrale separabile. Per superare alcuni problemi
derivanti da una sua applicazione pratica, viene successivamente formulato
uno schema euristico che implementa un meccanismo di mercato. L’algorit-
mo sviluppato sfrutta alcune proprieta` specifiche del problema sottostante
per arrivare a soluzioni vicine all’ottimo in tempi accettabili.
I risultati computazionali ottenuti simulandone l’applicazione su dati di
traffico reale, mostrano che sono possibili considerevoli riduzioni dei costi
rispetto ad una allocazione centrale delle risorse di tipo First-Planned-First-
Served.
Il contributo di questa tesi e` duplice. Il primo e` rappresentato dalla
descrizione, modellizzazione ed analisi matematica del problema di scambio
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di risorse ATFM, affrontato dalle compagnie aeree nel momento in cui la
capacita` della rete debba essere razionata tra di loro. Il secondo consiste nell’
innovazione metodologica rappresentata dalla formulazione del meccanismo
di mercato, che risponde a requisiti pratici e legislativi presenti nel sistema
reale e la cui simulazione ha fornito risultati incoraggianti.
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Summary
Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) is the service responsible to guar-
antee that the available capacity of the air transportation system is efficiently
used and never exceeded. It guarantees safety of air transportation by adopt-
ing a series of measures which range from strategic long-term ones to the
imposition of ground delays to flights at a tactical level. These ATFM de-
lays are imposed to individual flights at the departure airport prior to their
take-off, since it is safer and less costly to anticipate on the ground any delay
predicted somewhere in the system. They are assigned by a central authority
according to a First-Planned-First-Served principle, without taking into ac-
count individual Airlines’ preferences. This criteria of assignment can cause
an aggregated cost of delay experienced by users, higher than the minimal
one, due to the fact that the cost of delay is a non-linear function of the dura-
tion and it depends on many variables such as the type of aircraft, the specific
origin-destination pair, ecc. This thesis tackles the issue of formalizing and
analyzing alternative models for the assignment of ATFM resources which
take into account individual airlines preferences. In particular mathematical
programming models are analyzed, that extend the concept of ATFM slot
currently adopted to the one of Target Window, as proposed in the CATS
European project. Such a concept is in line with the SESAR program, re-
cently adopted in Europe to develop the new generation system of Air Traffic
Management, which imposes a direct involvement of Airspace users whenever
external constraints need to be enforced that modify their original requests.
The first Chapter provides a general introduction to the context of Air
Traffic Management and Air Traffic Control. In the second Chapter the
principles, methods and performances of the ATFM system are described
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xaccording to the current situation as well as to the SESAR target concept.
The problem of optimally assign ATFM resources is then described math-
ematically and then analyzed to uncover two fundamental structures that
determine its tractability: one corresponds to the case in which there is a
unique capacity constrained resource while in the second there is an unre-
stricted number of constrained resources.
In Chapter three a number of properties are proved that give insight
into the applicability of different mechanisms for a central calculation of the
optimal solution by the ATFM authority. Since such mechanisms involve
cost minimization for several agents they are formulated as exchanges, i.e.
particular types of auctions in which each participant may buy and/or sell
several indivisible goods.
The last part of the thesis included in Chapter four deals with the design
of iterative exchange mechanisms, whose application in real world presents
several advantages with respect to centralized models, from the distribution
of computational complexity among participants to the preservation of dis-
closure of private information by Aircraft Operators. In this case an optimal
model based on the Lagrangian relaxation of the separable central problem is
first formulated and analyzed. To overcome practical issues possibly deriving
from its application in real operations, an heuristic iterative Market-based
mechanism is finally formalized. This algorithm exploits some of the under-
lying characteristics specific to the problem to derive near-optimal solutions
in an acceptable time. Computational results are obtained by simulating
its implementation on real traffic data and they show that considerable cost
savings are possible with respect to a First-Planned-First-Served central al-
location.
The contribute of this thesis is twofold. The first is to provide a mathe-
matical description, modeling and analysis of the ATFM resource exchange
problem faced by Airspace users when network capacity needs to be rationed
among them. The second consists in the methodological innovation repre-
sented by the formulation of the Market Mechanism which is compliant with
several requirements represented by legislative and practical constraints and
whose simulation provided encouraging results.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Air Traffic
Management Principles
Commercial aviation has experienced a spectacular development in the
XXth century; the outstanding technological progresses have allowed more
and more people to access to air travel for both leisure and business, national
markets have become more and more connected to each other, thus stimulat-
ing competition, global trade and tourism. With the terrific increase in the
number of air movements and thus in density of air traffic, the captain was
no more able to carry out all the manouvres in a safe manner and started
to delegate more and more control to ground based stations. This was the
start of Air Traffic Control systems worldwide in the early 1930 with the
first radio-equipped control towers, followed by the routine use of radar for
approach and departure control after World War II. The International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) was established at the Chicago convention in
1944 to coordinate and regulate international air travel. In this circumstance
it was established a first fundamental set of rules of airspace, of safety stan-
dards and rights, which were subscribed by most nations. Nowadays ICAO
still promulagates rules and procedures for the safety of air traffic, through
annexes and documents. A key example is the Doc 4444: Rules of the Air and
Air Traffic Services, which constitutes a reference for the correct implemen-
tation of Air Traffic Control procedures, whose enforcement is nevertheless
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delegated to contracting States. ICAO also establishes the responsibilities
for Air Traffic Management (ATM) which encompasses the following areas:
• Airspace Management, which includes all those tasks related with the
planning of the Airspace infrastructure, its organization at a strategic
level (e.g. the design of the route network) and at a tactical one (e.g.
the dynamic use of Airspace, the civil/military coordination)
• Air Traffic Services, which includes Air Traffic Control (ATC) to flights,
flight information services and the alerting service.
• Air Traffic Flow Management, whose main role is to regulate traffic
in order to ensure that the available capacity of the system resources
(airports and airspace) is always respected and used efficiently.
More in general one refers to Air Navigation Services (ANS) as to a wider
set of tasks which comprises ATM, as well as the Communication, Navigation
and Surveillance (CNS) system, the meteorological services system and other
services which are auxiliary to aviation. According to ICAO rules each State
is responsible for providing Air Traffic Services as a public service and has
complete sovereignty over the Airspace within national boundaries. Those
services are delivered to users by Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP),
which in Europe are authorities independent from the civil aviation authority
whose role is the supervision and enforcement of standards and regulations
for civil aviation. In the United States the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) undertakes both these functions. In Europe the ANSPs are usually
organised at a national level either as government departments, operated by
civil servants, or as autonomous bodies belonging to the State or as priva-
tised companies (fully or partly). An example of this last type of status is the
UK ANSP (NATS), which is a public-private partnership jointly owned by
an Airline group consisting of 7 airlines, the Government, Airports Author-
ity and NATS employees. ANSPs in Europe are mostly financed through
the collection of air navigation service charges, which are levied for each
flight performed under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) in the Flight Informa-
tion Regions (FIRs). The EUROCONTROL Central Route Charges Office
3Figure 1.0.1: Map of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)
(CRCO) collects all those charges from Airspace Users and redistribute the
right amount to ANSPs on the base of the distance flown over each Member
State crossed and, less than proportionately, of the aircraft weight. This
is one of the roles of EUROCONTROL, the European Organisation for the
Safety of Air Navigation which includes today 38 Member States. It was
established in 1960 with the mission of coordinating, complementing and in-
tegrating the different air navigation services in Europe in order to improve
the overall performance, safety and sustainability of the whole European sys-
tem. The EUROCONTROL Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) for
instance, which is based in Brussels, centrally manages the Air Traffic Flow
Management service for the 44 states participating in the European Civil
Aviation Conference (ECAC), represented in Figure 1.0.1.
The principal stakeholders that interact on a daily basis to operate the
Air Traffic Management system can be grouped into three main categories:
• Air Navigation Service Providers, who enable the safe and expeditious
flow of air traffic by delivering Air Traffic Services within national
boundaries;
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• Airport operators, who provide the interface between ground and air
operations and constitute access points to the network;
• Aircraft Operators (AOs), they are the airspace users carrying on flights
to move passengers and freights around the globe, which is the the main
goal of civil aviation. Commercial Airlines operating scheduled flights
constitute the principal member in this category, while all other civil
aviation operations for remuneration or hire are grouped under the
classification of General Aviation.
1.1 The Air Traffic Control system
The two factors underlying the need for ATC are safety and efficiency.
Airspace users must have in fact enough space to avoid the risk of near
misses or collisions but at the same time the individual use of airspace shall
be minimal, within the constraint of safety, in order to maintain operational
efficiency. All the ATC system components described hereafter are conceived
to conciliate these two objectives.
1.1.1 Flight categories
Meteorological conditions constitute a strong constraint for air traffic,
one of which is represented by the flight rules under which a flight might be
operated. Instrument flight rules are regulations and procedures for flying
aircraft by referring only to the aircraft instrument panel for navigation. A
civil flight which is operated under IFR rules can rely on both on-board
instruments and on-ground instructions provided by Air Traffic Controllers
(ATCOs) via VHF radio channels on the basis of the radar information they
observe. Only IFR-rated pilots can operate under IFR procedures, allowing
them to fly while looking only at the instrument panel, even in the case that
visibility conditions are poor such as when the aircraft crosses clouds and it
follows ATC instructions to maintain separation from other aircraft.
This ensures that the pilot is always aware of the current situation around
him even in conditions of scarce visibility. In contrast, a flight operated
THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM 5
under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) is independent from ATC and the pilot is
responsible for maintaining separation from other vehicles and to determine
the correct route with the help of geographical landmarks. Hence a VFR
flight is subject to minimum visibility criteria constraints for safety reasons.
Most scheduled flights operate under IFR, while VFR ones are mostly
non-commercial, private recreational aircraft flights and can be executed
whenever meteorological conditions meet the minimum requirements, re-
ferred as visual meteorological conditions. Whenever these conditions are
not met only IFR flights can be operated under instrument meteorological
conditions, according to which the pilot controls the aircraft relying on flight
instruments while ATC provides separation. This means that the aircraft
is kept away from obstacles and other aircraft using the clearance issued by
ATCO, which contains instructions on heading or route to follow, altitude
and limits of validity, after which a new clearance from ATC is needed. This
clearance is based on the radar information that ATCOs observe, or through
aircraft position reports in areas where radar coverage is not available, sent
as voice radio transmissions. Aircraft position reports are not necessary if
ATC communicates that the aircraft is in radar contact.
ICAO specifies that the minimum vertical separation for IFR flight is
1000 feet in the airspace between ground and the altitude of 29000 feet, i.e
Flight Level (FL) 290, and 2000 feet above FL 290. However since 1997 most
Countries in the world have adopted Reduced Vertical Separation Minima
(RVSM) procedures, which fix the safe vertical separation to 1000 feet also in
the airspace above FL 290, thus increasing the maximum amount of aircraft
that an airspace can safely host, i.e the effective Airspace capacity. Horizontal
safe separation is usually fixed at 5 NM en route airspace and 3 NM in
terminal airspace.
1.1.2 The Geographical Organisation of Airspace
ANSPs provide ATC services within the FIRs of their competence, which
mostly coincide with national boundaries, with some minor exceptions due to
operational requirements such as multilateral agreements, through which an
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ANSP may delegate the responsibility for ATC provision in limited portions
of airspace to a neighbor State, in order to facilitate cross-border procedures.
The Airspace may be further classified as Upper Information Region (UIR)
in the area above a certain flight level. However a standard for the lower
limit of a UIR has not been established so far, thus existing UIRs extending
from FL 195 (i.e. 19500 feet altitude) to unlimited, others from FL 285 to
unlimited, ecc. The Area Control Centre (ACC) is the ground-based facility
responsible for controlling IFR aircraft at higher altitudes while en route,
within a particular FIR or UIR. During the execution of a flight and according
to the number of FIRs crossed by the aircraft, the responsibility may pass
from one ACC to a neighboring one through the so called handover procedure.
Besides grouping together all the instruments (prevalently radar screens) used
by ATCOs to monitor the progress of commercial flights and to guarantee the
safe separation among them, usually each ACC also houses a military ATCOs
dedicated solely to the provision of ATC services to military traffic while in
pursuance of operative missions. A Flow Management Position (FMP) is also
present in each European ACC, to establish ATFM measures in collaboration
with EUROCONTROL CFMU through a dedicated terminal.
ATCOs working within an ACC communicate via radio with pilots of
IFR flights passing through the Center’s airspace. A Center’s communica-
tion frequencies (typically in the very high frequency modulation aviation
bands, 118 MHz to 137 MHz, for overland control) are published in aeronau-
tical charts and manuals, and are also announced to a pilot by the previous
controller during a handover. Airspace controlled by an ACC is further split
into smaller ATC sectors of Airspace which may vary in number depending
on many factors (from 2 to 25 across the ECAC area), to allow ATCOs to
better manage the traffic. Each sector is assigned to a control team, typi-
cally composed of 2 members: the executive controller (who is responsible
for separation and sequencing flights and issues instructions/clearances to
pilots to provide separation) and the planning controller (who coordinates
and approves the flow of traffic in its sector determining as far as possible
conflict free trajectories). The Airspace extending in the vicinity of one or
more major airports is classified as Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) and
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is designed to handle traffic arriving or departing the airport(s) included in
it. Normally only IFR flights are allowed in it, since the density of traffic in
this area and its complexity (aircraft climbing or descending are more diffi-
cult to manage for both ATCOs and pilots) impose a precise instrumental
control.
1.1.3 The Route Structure
International air traffic is channeled along specified ATC routes and each
of them is part of a network of routes which is generally fixed within a FIR.
This permits ATCOs to manage traffic more easily since aircraft follow pre-
determined paths. An ATS route is defined by route specifications which
include a route designator, reporting requirements and the track to or from
significant waypoints. Those waypoints may correspond to the location of
ground-based navaids, such as VHF Omnidirectional Range (VOR) and Dis-
tance Measuring Equipment (DME) stations used by pilots since early 1950s
to determine the relative aircraft position, in which case they have a three-
letter identifier. Otherwise the waypoint has a five-letters identifier if it is just
a geographical coordinate (e.g. ODINA, KOMUR,...). Most of five-letters
waypoints define routes in upper airspaces, but they can also be present in
lower airspace.
In the en-route airspace the main routes currently consist of airways with
the usual width of 5NM and upper air routes with no defined width, which
always follow straight lines between consecutive pairs of waypoints. Although
the route structure is generally considered fixed, it is in fact subject to con-
tinuous refinements in order to optimize the traffic paths and minimize the
actual distances flown between origin/destination pairs. EUROCONTROL
since 1994 has been entrusted with the responsibility to organise and carry
out the necessary co-ordination of planning and implementation activities for
improving and upgrading the ATS route network in the ECAC area.
All operational changes in the route structure can be introduced accord-
ing to the Aeronautical Information Regulation And Control (AIRAC) cycle,
which lasts 28 days during which all the information relative to the specific
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AIRAC are valid. To guarantee the correct integration of information into
different systems, users must receive a paper copy at least 28 days in ad-
vance of the effective date. Whenever major changes are planned and where
additional notice is desirable and practicable, a publication date of at least
56 days in advance of the effective date should be used, in accordance with
ICAO Annex 15 document about Aeronautical Information Services (AIS).
1.2 The Airline Management of Flight Oper-
ations
Now that an outline of the air transport infrastructure has been sketched,
it is interesting to focus on the methodologies and principles that determine
the execution of a flight, from the airline scheduling construction as a re-
sponse to passengers’ demand to the interface between Aircraft operators
and traffic regulating authorities required to ensure safety of operations.
1.2.1 Airline schedule development
Whereas the ATC is distributed geographically, the Airspace users, who
are prevalently Airlines operating fleets of aircraft, have centralized much of
their planning and control activities. The prevalent model for a major Airline
operations is in fact today represented by hub-and-spoke networks.According
to this model flights connect a unique central hub airport to a number of
smaller peripheral airports, thus forming a star network (Economides, 1996).
This allows a single Airline to offer its customers a number of possible (in-
direct) city connections which grows more than linearly with the number of
spokes departing from hub. In fact by adding one new round-trip flight from
a hub where an Airline already connects to N cities, will create 2× (N + 1)
additional origin-destination (O/D) pairs. This organization of the network
makes it possible for passengers departing from outlying airports to connect
to a variety of destinations, thus generating for the Airline increasing returns
to scale.
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On the contrary, low cost and new entrant carriers typically prefer to
adopt a Point-to-Point network, where direct links are established between
any pair of airports for which there is enough demand volume to justify the
costs of establishing the link itself. Under this type of network configuration,
all the nodes (i.e. the local airports) are at the same hierarchical level thus
giving airlines more flexibility in managing demand fluctuations and elimi-
nating the constraint of connections between successive flights that causes
the typical traffic peaks at hub airports.
In general hub-and-spoke airlines want in fact to maximize the number of
possible connecting markets for passengers, but they also want to minimize
the passenger travel time, so they usually manage departures and arrivals
from/to the hub into clusters occurring at periodically spaced times, ac-
cording to which a great number of arrivals from spoke origins during time
period t, is followed by departures to spoke destinations at successive periods
T > t. This can obviously cause congestion at hub airport during the traffic
waves and a greater network sensitivity to delay than in the case of non-hub
networks (see Mayer and Sinai, 2003).
To efficiently manage these complex interactions in a rapid and informed
manner, this model of operations has led most of the biggest Airlines world-
wide to install their Airline Operations Center (AOC) at the hub Airport.
Whenever a disruption occurs affecting the operational schedule (e.g. a crew
member did not report for duty or an aircraft experiences malfunction), spe-
cialized teams of people work under the supervision of an operations control
manager, to solve the specific problem though a process known as Disrup-
tion Management or Operations Recovery (see e.g. Kohl et al., 2007). From
the AOC the Airline can monitor the state of all its flights, checking if they
are following the schedule that was previous defined by other areas of the
company. The execution of a flight is in fact a result of a long and complex
process that an Airline may start years before the day of operations.
This process usually starts with the schedule design, which defines mar-
kets to serve and the service frequency as well as the departure time for
each flight leg. This first step is strategic since it determines the competitive
position of an Airline on the market and is determinant for its profitability.
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The schedule design is typically performed manually by Airline experts or by
optimization models which determine incremental changes to existing flight
schedules (see Barnhart et al., 2003). This is due to the extreme complexity
of modeling the real problem, which needs to capture critical interactions
among internal Airline resources and external resources such as Airport slots
(cf. Section 1.2.2).
The second step is the fleet assignment, i.e. the decision of what size of
aircraft to assign to each flight, based on the Airline fleet. This problem can
be formulated as a multicommodity network flow problem (see Hane et al.,
1995), with nodes representing times and locations of leg departures and
arrivals and arcs representing either flight legs or idle aircraft on the ground.
After these decisions are made, the next step is to decide the assignment of
individual aircraft of the type previously determined, to flight legs, in order
to determine aircraft rotations, which are mainly subject to maintenance
constraints.
Successively each flight is assigned to a specific crew, thus determining a
crew schedule where the objective is to minimize the cost of selected pairings
(i.e. the multiple days working schedules that specify number of hours worked
per day, rest hours between working periods, the time the crew is away from
home,...) and then these pairings are assigned to crew members with monthly
rosters. The crew pairing and rostering problems are typically modelled as set
partitioning problems, with binary decision variables corresponding to each
possible pairing and to each crew assignment respectively. Due to the billions
of variables involved researchers have proposed branch and price techniques
to generate solutions without explicitly considering all of them (Barnhart
et al., 1998).
1.2.2 The Strategic Assignment of Airport Slots
The allocation of airport capacity constitutes an administrative approach
to the strategic management of demand, since all the Airlines that intend
to schedule a flight movement to and from a coordinated airport need to
be assigned an airport slot for this purpose. In the European Union the
THE AIRLINE MANAGEMENT OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS 11
system for airport slot allocation is based on the IATA Worldwide Scheduling
Guidelines (Council Regulation No 95/93 amended by Regulation 793/2004),
as well as in most Countries worldwide. The Airport slot is defined, according
to International Air Transport Association (2009), as “the scheduled time of
arrival or departure at the terminal. An allocated slot will take account
of all the coordination parameters at the airport, e.g. runway(s), taxiways,
aircraft parking stands, gates, terminal capacity (e.g. check-in and baggage
delivery), environmental constraints e.g. night restrictions, etc.”.
According to the level of congestion, three types of Airport are defined
by IATA: fully coordinated (or level 3, requiring the assignment of a slot
by the airport coordinator), schedule-facilitated (or level 2 for which there
is potential for congestion at certain periods of time, voluntary cooperation
with a schedule facilitator is required), non-coordinated (or level 1, where
there is low congestion and airport capacity is adequate to meet users’ de-
mand). As of 2009, 156 airports worldwide were designated fully-coordinated
(International Air Transport Association, 2009), including practically every
European major airport, and used the IATA schedule coordination approach.
To this purpose the IATA Schedules Conferences take place twice a year, in
advance of the summer and winter schedules, to allocate airport slots to Air-
lines. Each fully coordinated airport must specify a declared capacity (in
number of aircraft movements per unit of time) taking into account all the
constraints affecting availability of resources. Users interested in scheduling
operations at these airports must send a formal request for each desired slot.
The available capacity is then allocated following two fundamental criteria:
historical precedence (the so-called grandfather rights) and time adjustments
of historical slots. This first allocation is conditional to the fact that such
slots were effectively used in the previous equivalent season for at least 80%
of the times (the use-it-or-lose it rule). After this first assignment to incum-
bent airlines, a slot pool is created with the remaining slots, 50% of which is
allocated free of charge by the slot coordinator to new entrant airlines, i.e.
airlines holding less than five slots at that particular airport if the request is
accepted. The size of the pool may only permit new entry from very small
carriers offering low frequency services, which are unlikely to pose significant
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competitive challenges to high frequency services offered by established car-
riers (DotEcon Ltd., 2001). The remaining slots in the pool are allocated
giving priority to year-round commercial air services.
The slots at a coordinated airport, allocated after this first stage, can be
exchanged or transferred between airlines on a one for one basis by any num-
ber of airlines, conditionally to the approval of the coordinator. Exchanges
can involve a compensation if this is not prohibited by the laws of the rel-
evant country, while slot transfers between Airlines can only occur for slots
not allocated to new entrants.
Under the EC Slot Regulation, exchange and transfer are allowed under
certain conditions:
• slots may be transferred by an air carrier from one route or type of
service to another route or type of service operated by the same air
carrier;
• slots may be transferred unilaterally within the same commercial fam-
ily;
• slots may be exchanged one by one, subject to confirmation by the slot
coordinator.
The text of the current EC Regulation is silent on the question of ex-
changes with monetary transfers associated, i.e. the so called secondary
trading. However in a formal EC Communication the European Commis-
sion stated that “the exchanges of slots for monetary and other consider-
ation, more commonly referred to as secondary trading, are taking place
at a number of congested Community airports. This has had certain ad-
vantages, notably in allowing the creation of additional services on specific
routes. The text of the current Regulation is silent on the question of ex-
changes with monetary and other consideration to reflect differences in value
between slots at different times of day and other factors. Given that there is
no clear and explicit prohibition of such exchanges, the Commission does not
intend to pursue infringement proceedings against Member States where such
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exchanges take place in a transparent manner, respecting all the other ad-
ministrative requirements for the allocation of slots set out in the applicable
legislation.” (COM (2008) 227, 31-4-2008)
Such communication effectively allows for secondary airport slot trading,
in particular in response to the events actually observed in real situation.
One of the practices that raised questions about its legitimacy is the artificial
exchange one, i.e. the practice of exchanging a valuable slot for a so-called
“junk slot” at a commercially less attractive time, which is returned to the
coordinator after the exchange concludes. Artificial exchanges are likely to be
accompanied by monetary compensations (de Wit and Burghouwt, 2008). As
an example, in 1998 Air UK ceased to British Airways slots previously used to
connect London Heathrow with Guernsey, in exchange for less valuable slots.
The Guernsey government decided to summon the Heathrow slot coordinator
but the English High Court held that the artificial exchanges, whose meaning
was not qualified by the provisions of the Regulation, were exchanges in the
ordinary meaning of the language and not unilateral slot transfers. Also
side payments in exchange for airport slots have been employed in practice,
as it was the case in December 2007 when Alitalia ceased three pairs of
airport slots at Heathrow in three separate deals for a total of e92 million
(Done, 2007). Another example of side payments is the acquisition by Virgin
Atlantic and Qantas Airlines of three pairs of Heathrow slots each from the
small British regional airline Flybe for a total amount of £ 40 million (Kilian,
2008).
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Chapter 2
Air Traffic Flow and Capacity
Management
The Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) is the branch of ATM ded-
icated to regulate flights in order to ensure that the available capacity of
the system is efficiently used and never exceeded, in order to enable a safe,
order and expeditious flow of traffic. In Europe this concept has recently
evolved to the wider Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management (ATFCM),
to underline its role in managing the balance between demand and capacity
by coordinating all actors involved.
In Europe the centralized ATFM service is provided by EUROCONTROL
CFMU, as prescribed by ICAO doc. 4444 that sets down three main phases
around which ATFM is organized:
1. Strategic Flow Management takes place from several months up to
seven days prior to the day of operation and includes all the long term
activities relative to the elaboration of the route allocation plans. These
mainly consist in the identification of major congestion problem and
the proposal of measures to alleviate them, the planning for extra traffic
due to exceptional events (e.g. the 2006 soccer world cup in Germany),
the assessment of the impact of actions proposed and the partial elab-
oration of the contingency routing scheme to be adopted in case of
serious disruptions of ATS.
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2. Pre-Tactical Flow Management takes place during six days prior to the
day of operation and consists of planning and coordination activities
aimed at the identification of potential overloads and the preparation
of preventive measures. These measures can vary from the activation
of mandatory routes, to the negotiation with local FMPs to increase
capacity by proper ATC sectors configurations, to slot allocation reg-
ulations. The output is the ATFCM Daily Plan (ADP) published via
ATFCM Notification Message (ANM) and Network News.
3. Tactical Flow Management takes place on the day of the operation,
until the departure of the flight. This phase updates the daily plan
according to the actual traffic and capacity. The management of the
traffic is made through slot allocation and/or ad-hoc re-routings.
2.1 The Airspace Capacity
The main objective ATFM is to guarantee flights’ safety throughout the
network and this is achieved by monitoring air traffic and balancing with
available capacity through appropriate measures such as ATFM slots. The
capacity of an airspace depends on the individual capacity of the sectors
composing it. In Europe the capacity of a sector is defined as the maximum
number of aircraft that can enter the sector during a specified period, while
still permitting an acceptable level of controller workload (Majumdar, 2007).
The workload experienced by ATCOs is thus the factor determining capac-
ity, which is usually assessed based on task time obtained from observation
of ATCOs actions, for example through real time Human-In-the-Loop (HIL)
simulations. Task times are successively used to determine effective work-
load induced by traffic, usually through model-based simulations. Recent
studies indicate that the workload experienced by controllers is affected by
a complex interaction of a number of factors (Majumdar and Ochieng, 2002,
Mogford et al., 1995) related with (i) the situation in the airspace, since
several features of air traffic and of sector geography interact to produce
air traffic ATC complexity; (ii) the state of the equipment, determined by
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the design, reliability accuracy of equipment both on-ground and on-board;
(iii) the state of the controller, e.g. the controllers age, experience, decision
making strategies.
These parameters can be thought of as the drivers of controller workload,
and consequently of airspace capacity, i.e. airspace capacity drivers. To ad-
just capacity a number of measures can be taken, to modify these drivers. At
a strategic level for example, airspace management actions aim at designing
routes, individual sectors’ geometry and sector configurations that minimize
controller workload. Complexity factors are also taked into account when
measuring the performances of the ATM system. The EUROCONTROL
Performance Review Commission relies its assessment upon the indicator of
interactions, i.e. the simultaneous presence of two aircraft in a volume of
Airspace of 197.5 NM3 (see ATM Cost-effectiveness (ACE) Working Group,
2006).
At a pre-tactical level increases of capacity can be obtained by imple-
menting or extending the opening time of different configurations of sectors,
as a trade-off between the number of controllers required by a specific config-
uration and the mismatch between planned demand and available capacity.
2.2 Information Exchanges between Airlines
and ATFM
The final process that an Airline must execute for each scheduled flight
is to file a Flight Plan (FPL).
According to the current system all civil IFR flights that are intended to
operate within the Integrated Initial Flight Plan Processing System (IFPS)
zone, which is the area covered by the ATS facilities of the ECAC States,
must have a valid FPL filed. The FPL has to be sent to the IFPS between 3
and 120 hours before the Estimated Off-Block Time (EOBT) by the Aircraft
Operator. Repetitive FPLs for the flights scheduled with regular frequencies
can be filed to the RPL system at CFMU only once at the beginning of
the season and are then they are regularly processed by the IFPS system 20
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hours before EOBT.
This system receives all FPL data and sent them to two CFMU units lo-
cated in Haren (Brussels) and Bretigny-sur-Orge (Paris) in order to process
them by sharing the workload between 2 facilities and to make the system re-
dundant. Two networks are used for this purpose, the AFTN (Aeronautical
Fixed Telecommunication Network) and the SITA (Societe Internationale de
Telecommunications Aeronautiques), which form together a high speed Wide
Area Network. The former has direct access points located at almost all sig-
nificant ground points in the world, such as airports, ACCs, ecc. while the
latter is accessed directly by airlines, computer reservation systems, airports
and governments around the world. The FPLs are first automatically checked
for validity with respect to the correct format (which can be either ICAO
or ADEXP) and with respect to all the aeronautical information contained
in the European AIS Database (EAD). This unique source of information
merge into one single database the Aeronautical Information Publication
(AIP) detailing all regulations, procedures and other information issued by
the national civil aviation administrations, the Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs)
concerning all the temporary changes in conditions to aeronautical facilities,
services or procedures, as well as other documents relevant to the safe op-
eration of aircraft. Another CFMU publication that must be considered by
AOs when compiling flight plans is the Route Availability Document (RAD),
which is updated at each AIRAC and integrates both structural and ATFCM
requirements as a listing of all restrictions on routes such as city-pair level
cappings or route limitations state by state.
Once the FPL has been acknowledged as valid by the IFPS, an ACK
message is sent back to the sender and no further action is required by the
AO until the day of operations. The invalid FPLs can either be corrected
manually by IFPS staff, in which case a MAN message is returned to the
sender that has no action to perform, or rejected by a REJ message, in
which case a new valid FPL has to be resubmitted to the system.
All the FPLs accepted are assigned a unique identifier and then sent to
all the ATS Units concerned with the management of the flight and to the
Enhanced Tactical Flow Management System (ETFMS).
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Also the 4D profile (i.e. location + time) for each flight is estimated, based
on the aircraft performances and the information contained in the FPL such
as route, level, speed, and time estimates (EUROCONTROL Central Flow
Management Unit, 2009b).
Repetitive Flight Plans can be sent to the RPL Unit by e-mail or through
SITA network once for all seasonal scheduled flights, and they represent
almost 50% of all flight plans submitted to IFPS.
There are a variety of software tools available to flight planners to help in
compiling FPLs, which integrate all the up-to-date aeronautical information
available (i.e NOTAM, AIS, ecc.) but also optimization engines to calculate
optimal flight plans according to weather conditions and users’ preferences
such as the cost index, a parameter expressing the cost of time relative to the
cost of fuel for each flight according to the company business objectives. This
flight planning tools can be used at pre-tactical or tactical level for generating
FPL (rather than RPL) that are optimal according to latest meteo condi-
tions, to the Conditioanl Route Availability Message (CRAM), establishing
on the day before operations which conditional routes are open and which
are closed for military exercises, the ATFM Notification Message (ANM),
listing planned ATFM measures the day before operations and the ATFM
Information Message (AIM), listing information about ATFM measures on
the day of operations.
2.3 The Tactical Assignment of ATFM Slots
The ATFM slot allocation measure is based on the universally accepted
principle that delays on the ground are safer and less costly than those in
the air. Any forecast delay somewhere in the system is thus anticipated at
the departure airport prior to the take-off and the traffic is controlled in a
safe and simple manner. In the rest of this section the process of ATFM slot
allocation is described, in accordance with the mechanisms employed under
both the European and the United States system.
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2.3.1 The European Enhanced Tactical Flow Manage-
ment System
During the 48 hours prior to the execution of a flight, the Enhanced
Tactical Flow Management System is feeded with flight plan data coming
from IFPS. This information is then compared by the ETFMS with the flow
restrictions, known as ATFM regulations (or simply regulations), declared to
users through ANM and AIM messages. Each regulation specifies the area
affected, the maximal rate of flights that the area can accept and the period
of activation. The maximal rate establishes the limit on the number of flights
that can enter a certain element of the airspace per period of time. ATFM
regulations are established during the pre-tactical phase based on the traffic
forecasts, available from FPLs and other past data, and on the assessment
of the impact of regulations on traffic flows, which strongly relies on the
experience of operators both at CFMU and at the national FMP positions.
Whether a flight is permitted to depart at its planned time depends on the
effect of flow restrictions placed on the airports and airspaces through which
the flight is planned.
The Computer Assisted Slot Allocation (CASA) system, a module within
the ETFMS, constitutes the main tool to implement the slot allocation pro-
cedure. The CASA system is largely automatic and centralised and works
in a passive mode from a user perspective. In fact the sole act of filing a
flight plan effectively constitutes a request for a slot, since CASA uses FPLs
to calculate for each flight the Estimated Take Off Time (ETOT), by sum-
ming the taxi time to the Estimated Off Block Time (EOBT) published in
the FPL. Successively an Estimated Time Over (ETO) is calculated for each
point of entry into each sector crossed. This allows the system to assign to
each flight a first provisional slot based on the ETO on the restricted location
which constitutes a capacity constrained resource. For each constrained re-
source, the number of slots available is defined by its maximal hourly rate of
acceptance multiplied by the number of hours of activation. This set of slots
constitutes the Slot Allocation List (SAL) for the given capacity-constrained
resource.
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Each flight is given a provisional slot based on its ETO on the restricted
location. Each slot has capacity of 1 flight, hence if the slot corresponding
to the original ETO of the flight has not been already assigned to another
flight, it is available and the flight will not be delayed. Otherwise the slot
is assigned to the flight with the lowest ETO, according to a First-Planned-
First-Served (FPFS) principle, and the flight with the greatest ETO receives
a later slot, corresponding to a new Calculated Time Over (CTO) which
will be greater than the original ETO. In the case a flight is subject to
several ATFM regulations, the highest delay, caused by the slot in the most
penalizing regulation crossed, is forced also in the other ones. At a certain
time before the flight EOBT, known as Slot Issue Time (SIT) occurring
2 hours before EOBT at the earliest, the operator of the regulated flight
and the ATC concerned, receive a Slot Allocation Message (SAM), which
defines the Calculated Take-Off Time (CTOT) for the flight. This implies
that aircraft must take off during the time range between CTOT - 5 minutes
and CTOT + 10 minutes. This is the only effective ATFM slot that the
flight must respect, being calculated backward from the CTO on the most
penalizing regulation. The AO and ATC are jointly responsible for CTOT
compliance at the departure aerodrome. This implies that AOs need to
plan the departure of a flight, taking into account the taxi-time, in order
to ensure that the aircraft will be ready for start up in sufficient time to
comply with its CTOT. On the other hand ATC at the airport must include
CTOT in the ATC clearance procedure taking into account all applicable
ATFM slots when clearence is issued. If an AO cannot respect its assigned
slot, it must be communicate the revised EOBT through a Delay message
(DLA) or a Modification message (CHG) and will receive a new CTOT. In
the case the AO cannot estimate a new EOBT, it must send a Slot Missed
Message (SMM) and the ETFMS returns a Flight Suspension Message (FLS)
(EUROCONTROL Central Flow Management Unit, 2009b).
A flight that has been allocated a CTOT may still reduce the delay in the
case some other regulated flight is canceled and its slot becomes available.
In this case a flight which is in the default Ready For Improvement (RFI)
status, will receive a Slot Revision Message (SRM) in case of improvement.
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Two flights operated by the same AOs may swap their slots if they have
both a CTOT issued and they are both subject to the most penalizing regula-
tion. The AO must submit the swap request (maximum one swap per flight)
to CFMU either directly to the Central Flow Helpdesk or via an FMP. CFMU
confirms the feasibility of the slot swap only in the case it has no negative
network effect on the system (EUROCONTROL Central Flow Management
Unit, 2009b).
Another measure that AOs can adopt for trying to reduce ATFM delays is
to re-route a flight through longer but less congested area(s), in order to avoid
the regulated one(s). This can be done by sending either a CHG message
or a Cancellation message (CNL) and then refiling the flight plan using the
Replacement Flight Plan Procedure (RFP), according to the information
about current ATFM measures contained in the AIM.
2.3.2 U.S. ATFM Environment and Systems
While both European and United States air navigation systems are oper-
ated with similar technology and operational concepts they present some fun-
damental differences. The US sky is managed as a unique National Airspace
System (NAS) through standardized automations and procedures.
There is a unique service provider, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) which coordinates from the Air Traffic Control System Command Cen-
ter (ATCSCC) in Virginia all the Traffic Management Units (TMUs) located
at the 21 Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs) around the Country.
Each TMU is responsible for the management of traffic problems that are
within the scope of the ARTCC. The final level of the hierarchy consists of
TMUs at the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities, the
Center Radar Approach Control (CERAP) facilities, and Air Traffic Con-
trol Towers (ATCT). The TRACON and CERAP TMUs manage problems
specific to the terminal areas under their control.
The Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS) is used by the FAA
to perform all ATFM functions, according to various sources of information
such as the Official Airline Guide for Airline schedules, the airline flight data
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messages during daily operations, messages from ARTCCs and TRACONs
facilities, weather and geographical information as well as information from
other international ATC systems such as European departure messages.
ETMS processes these data in order to maintain a set of databases capable
of representing current and projected traffic demand data for a 24 hours
look ahead period. Flight data messages sent by airlines are used to correct
predictions that are continuously refines until real-time data from airborne
flights are processed to update the current and projected NAS picture.
Besides re-routing actions, the main other tools used as ATFM actions
are:
• Ground Delay Programs (GDP): when the demand for arrivals into
an airport is predicted to exceed significantly the available capacity,
aircraft are delayed on the ground previous to their departure according
to Ground Holding (GH) procedures.
• Airspace Flow Programs (AFP): Similar to GDPs, when excessive con-
gestion is predicted for an area of airspace, defined as a Flow Con-
strained Area (FCA), GH is adopted as an ATFM measure.
• Ground Stops (GS): an extreme form of GH, according to which all
departures of aircraft bound for a particular destination airport are
temporarily postponed.
• Miles-In-Trail (MIT) restriction: when a regional ATS provider impose
such a restriction, the adjacent upstream regional ATS provider has
responsibility for maintaining a traffic flow at or below the restricted
level. This can be achieved by airborne holdings, reroutings or by
issuing similar flow restrictions on flights further upstream. In this
way, it is possible for a flow restriction to propagate through much
of the airspace system, possibly eventually leading to ground holds at
airports of origin.
Thus any problems arising on the day of operations due to en route ca-
pacity constraints or congestions at different airports, are typically addressed
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separately through different GDPs and AFPs. In particular if a flight is al-
ready subject to a GDP, it is exempted from any other possible AFP derived
by a FCA it may cross (see Volpe National Transportation Systems, 2007).
Only under particular conditions, such as in situations of adverse weather
affecting wide regions of airspace, these ATFM measures become dependent
among each other.
Another important difference is the strategic management of airport re-
sources: In Europe in fact traffic at major airports (i.e. coordinated airports)
is controlled in terms of volume and concentration through the assignment
of airport slots in the strategic phase, several months in advance to the day
of operations (cf. Section 1.2.2). In the U.S. instead only four airports are
subject to High Density Rules (HDR) limiting the maximum number of IFR
takeoffs/landings per hour during certain hours of the day (New-York JFK,
New-York LaGuardia, Chicago OHare and Washington Ronald Reagan). Dif-
ferently to an EU airport slot, a slot allocated at an U.S. Airport subject to
HDR, only refers to runway use and separate negotiations are necessary to
acquire other airport resources (e.g. gates, check-in desks, baggage handling
systems, etc.). At all other U.S. airports airline scheduling is unrestricted
and demand levels are controlled by airlines and adapted depending on the
expected cost of delays and the expected value of operating additional flights.
This results in a higher variability of departure delays whenever there is a
mismatch between scheduled demand and available airport capacity.
2.3.2.1 Collaborative Decision Making in the U.S.
These specific features of the U.S. ATFM system have enabled the adop-
tion of a vast Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) program. CDM is a
joint government-industry initiative aimed at improving the ATFM by in-
creasing the exchange of information and improving decision-support tools.
The CDM effort (Wambsganss, 2001) was initiated in the ’90s in response
for dissatisfaction expressed by both Airspace users and FAA on the way
GDPs were planned and controlled at that time. In particular the FAA had
realized the need for informing users with the most up-to-dated information
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whenever ground delays or ground stops had to be imposed on the flights
they operated. There was the general feeling among AOs that the allocation
procedures used by the ATCSCC were always fair and efficient. In particular
each airline wished to gain more control over the specific allocation of ATFM
delays to its own flights. On the other hand the ATCSCC had realized
the importance of being informed with the decision of users regarding flight
cancellation and delays due to any reason non imputable to GDP, having
them an impact on the efficiency of resources’ allocation during GDPs and
hence on global delays.
The CDM philosophy can be interpreted as the application application
of the principles of information sharing and distributed decision making to
ATFM.
The first procedure used under U.S. CDM to allocate resources during
GDPs is the Ration-by-schedule (RBS) algorithm, that produces an initial
assignment of slots to flights. Each airline can then decide to modify this
slot-to-flight assignment for its own flights, through cancellation and sub-
stitution procedures. In practice these processes transform the slot-to-flight
first assignment obtained by RBS allocation into a slot-to-airline assignment,
since AO are free to swap slots between pairs of flights or to cancel a less
profitable flight and assign its slot to another flight, thus reducing its de-
lay. After this intra-airline exchange, the compression algorithm, which is
carried out by the FAA, is run to maximize slot utilization by performing
inter-airline slot exchanges, in order to ensure that no slot goes unused.
The final step, Compression, maximizes slot utilization by performing
an inter-airline slot exchange. The reason for this is that cancellations and
substitutions may create “holes” in the current schedule; that is, there will
be arrival slots that have no flights assigned to them. The purpose of the
compression step is to move flights up in the schedule to fill these slots,
according to the priority rule that first candidates to fill a hole are those
flights operated by the same Airline; in the case that no flight of the same
Airline is available to receive the slot (e.g. their scheduled time is later that
the slot), it is assigned to the earliest scheduled flight operated by any other
Airlines and so on. Then the Airline that released the slot is awarded with
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the earliest slot that becomes vacant through the process and can be used
by one of its flights.
Hence the compression procedure in this case can be interpreted as an
exchange among airlines of the slots distributed through the initial RBS al-
location. Despite of the competition that may exist among different airlines,
each of them has an incentive to release slots even if a competitor airline
will profit directly, since it will also enjoy benefits through a chain of delay
reductions with respect to the first RBS allocation. Two groups of flights are
exempted from the basic RBS allocation: flights that are currently airborne,
since they can not be assigned a ground delay, and flights selected according
to the distance of their departure airports from the GDP (arrival) airport
(Ball and Lulli, 2004). The motivation for the latter exemption is the great
level of uncertainty associated with capacity constraints 4 or 5 hours in ad-
vance of the arrival, which can make unnecessary the ground delay suffered
by the flight.
The Slot Credit Substitutions (SCS) constitutes a more dynamic form of
slot exchange, which has been recently introduced by the CDM working group
(Vossen and Ball, 2006b). Through SCS an Airline can submit a cancellation
request for a flight, associated with slot release, conditional to the assignment
of a later slot to be used by another flight in the fleet, which would thus reduce
its delay. The FAA monitors such requests on a continuous basis, and, if
possible, immediately implements the associated exchange(s) of slots. SCS
can be viewed as a real-time version of the Compression procedure, which is
a batch process run periodically and provides increased trading opportunities
over compression.
2.4 Performances of the Current ATFM Sys-
tem
Air Traffic Flow Management, coupled with Capacity management into
the wider scope of ATFCM, is the primary means of ensuring flight punc-
tuality and efficiency, whilst managing at best the available capacity on the
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air and on the ground. The ATFM system is mainly based, under the cur-
rent mode of operation, on regulating mechanisms that cause traffic flow
regulation under certain conditions. The most largely used control action at
a tactical phase is the imposition to aircraft of a calculated take-off time,
which is the final outcome of a longer and complex process which has been
outlined in the previous section. This section describes and reports a high
level analysis about the main indicators of the performances of the ATFM
system.
2.4.1 Delays in Air Traffic Management
There are different perceptions of aircraft delays by different types of sys-
tem actors. Airlines and passengers have interest in reducing to the minimum
arrival delays and are less concerned about departure delays (although they
are correlated). Airport operators and handlers are interested in maintaining
on-time operations both on aircraft arriving and departing. Some margins
of tolerance with respect to timings are always present in air transportation
in order to be able to cope with small disturbances that may happen during
operations. There are tolerances associated with almost each type of timing
during aircraft operations; for example the ATFM slot is defined as the time
interval [CTOT − 5minutes;CTOT + 10minutes], that mostly reflects the
grade of predictability associated with the taxi time duration. Flight op-
erations occurring with a deviation of less than 15 minutes with respect to
their scheduled time are usually referred as on-time. These tolerances intro-
duce a certain flexibility that makes the entire system more robust to small
variations in the duration of operations.
2.4.1.1 The Notion of Delay
According to Institut du Transport Ae´rien (2000), delays affect flight
operations at several phases during its preparation, from the strategical one
to the pre-tactical to the execution. At the strategical phase in fact, when an
airline establishes a flight program, it will lengthen the scheduled duration
of flight times or turnaround times at a given airport, according to previous
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Figure 2.4.1: Delay composition in flight operations (Institut du Transport
Ae´rien, 2000)
experience of delay encountered under the same circumstances. This allows
to absorb more easily delays that are likely to occur.
During the day of operations then each flight can be decomposed into
four main parts: turnaround process on the ground, out-bound taxiing at the
departing airport, en-route phase and in-bound taxiing at the arrival airport.
The arrival delay is just the linear composition of the delays occurring at
these different phases minus the buffer (cf. Fig. 2.4.1).
Delays imputable directly to a specific operation related to the execution
of a flight are called primary delays. These delays can successively propagate
throughout the day on subsequent flight legs, thus becoming reactionary de-
lays. These knock-on delays might be experienced either by the same aircraft
causing the primary delay (i.e. rotational reactionary delay) or by others
(i.e. non-rotational reactionary delay) (Cook, 2007). Airlines typically insert
larger buffers into the schedules of earlier flights in the morning, since these
have a greater operational impact due to the largest number of reactionary
delays they may cause during all subsequent operations.
However the number of buffer minutes padded into a schedule is the result
of a compromise and all airlines have their models to decide the correct
amount, if any at all. In principle the right duration of the strategic buffer
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can be considered as the one that equals the expected cost of the tactical
delay it is intended to absorb, plus an extra margin for uncertainty.
2.4.1.2 The Causes of Delay
Flight delays are caused by a variety of reasons related either directly
or not with the execution of the flight affected. Among the primary direct
causes of delay there are the turnaround procedures, which is the set of oper-
ations that take place between the time aircraft is in-block at the gate and its
push-back for executing the next leg. These include passenger and baggage
boarding and un-boarding, aircraft cleaning, refueling, ecc. All these opera-
tions are subject to stochasticity in duration and can cause a delay (Fricke
and Schultz, 2009). Once the turnaround process has terminated the aircraft
is usually ready for take-off, hence it can push-back from the gate condition-
ally to ATC clearance and possibly to ATFM slot. From the time it leaves
the gate it is subject to taxi time variations (first out-bound from departing
airport and secondly in-bound the destination one) which mainly depend on
the location of the stand with respect to the runway and on airport conges-
tion; after the take off it is subject to in-flight time variation (mainly due
to winds encountered en-route and tactical manoeuvres imposed by ATC),
until it finally lands at the destination airport. In order to standardize the
reporting of delay occurrences IATA Delay Codes were created to provide
airlines with a unique codification to specify the responsible for the delay,
the phase and the actors penalized. They can be roughly divided into causes
imputable to Airline processes, Airport limitations, En-route restrictions or
weather conditions. Very often airlines and ground handling companies have
bonus-malus based contracts which establish monetary compensations due to
delays in providing services, calculated based on the delay reports compiled
by the captain using such codes.
Figure 2.4.2 reports the contribution to primary departure delays of differ-
ent causes during year 2008, showing that delays caused by ATFM measures
constitute nearly 30% of all primary sources of delay in Europe.
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Figure 2.4.2: Primary departure delay causes during year 2008 (source: EU-
ROCONTROL Central Office for Delay Analysis, 2008)
2.4.1.3 The Cost of Delays
It is interesting to consider the impact of flight delays in terms of costs
born by the Airspace users. There are two main types of costs induced by
delays: operational costs and strategic costs.
Operational costs are those caused either directly by a primary delay, or
indirectly due to a reactionary delay and are composed by the costs expe-
rienced by passengers, who are the final users bearing the opportunity cost
represented by operational delays, since the time lost is not employed to work
or to derive utility from leisure. Also the Aircraft Operators have a cost di-
rectly linked with operational delays, since they have to employ human and
other resources to recover for delays and to maintain the schedule, and also
to compensate passengers according to regulations such as European Regu-
lation 261/2004 or to corporate policies. In addition to this “hard costs”,
Airlines typically experience in the long term other “soft costs”, such as loss
of market share due to passenger dissatisfaction (Cook et al., 2009).
The second type of delay costs are the indirect ones, caused by the antic-
PERFORMANCES OF THE CURRENT ATFM SYSTEM 31
ipation of delays into schedules at the strategic phase through buffers. These
strategic delays increase the schedule robustness and network stability on
one hand, but on the other hand may cause an aircraft sub-optimal utiliza-
tion and unnecessary consumption of ground resources such as gates (Cook,
2007). Although these costs are usually not taken into consideration explic-
itly by airlines’ accounts, so they are in a certain sense “hidden”, they are
nonetheless real costs representing the opportunity of being able to use such
resources in another way, or to save money by not having them.
It is generally agreed that that predictability, or rather lack of it, is an
underpinning cause of the financial losses suffered as a consequence of delay.
If all delays could be predicted with confidence to be exactly 10 minutes, then
schedules could be re-adjusted accordingly, and there would subsequently be
no tactical delay costs as such, apart from the opportunity costs of not using
the 10 minutes.
A first preliminary study commissioned by EUROCONTROL to Institut
du Transport Ae´rien (2000) estimates that the cost to airlines due to op-
erational deviation from scheduled times is between e1.6 Billions and e2.3
Billions for year 1999 and that the cost to passengers is of the same order of
magnitude. A successive study performed by the Transport Studies Group
of the University of Westminster and published by EUROCONTROL (Cook
et al., 2004) constitutes the most comprehensive report on the cost of delays
in the air traffic management system up to date. It gives delay cost figures
quoted by type of aircraft, phases of flight, type of delay and delay duration
according to the data provided by several Airlines, handling agents, aircraft
operating lessors, airports, EUROCONTROL and IATA. Costs of delay are
calculated at the tactical and strategic levels for 12 different types of aircraft
and according to 3 different cost scenarios.
The cost figures provided by authors show that airborne delays are typ-
ically more expensive than delays consumed at-gate, thus validating one of
the fundamental principles of ATFM delays. They also point out that the
tactical cost of delay is a non-linear function of the length of delay, since
costs per minute are considerably higher for longer duration delays. They
consider therefore two specific delay durations to be representative of short
32 AIR TRAFFIC FLOW AND CAPACITY MANAGEMENT
(i.e. 15 minutes) and long (i.e. 65 minutes) delays. Authors specify that
these values are not strict but rather have to be considered indicative for
delays of the same order of magnitude. In particular the 65 minute value
represents a typical amount of delay that causes a series of costs (e.g. a
missed connection) which would not be incurred for shorter delay durations,
such as 15 minutes. Additionally for each delay duration they provide a low,
base and high cost scenario to better represent different situations and for
the purposes of comparison, according to the aircraft load factor, the number
of connecting passengers, the range of the flight leg, the fuel price range. For
example for a delay around 15 minutes it is relatively unlikely that crew runs
out of hours and that passengers miss connections, thus these costs are only
assigned to the high cost scenario for 15 minute delays. This is a far more
realistic approach than treating all 15 minute delays as alike.
The network impact of primary delays is also quantified through base mul-
tipliers (1.20 and 1.80) for the two delay durations considered. Each minute
of primary delay hence causes, on average, 30 to 40 seconds of reactionary
delay. Successively these time figures are transformed into cost figures. The
resulting cost curve between 15 and 65 minutes delay is likely to be complex
and irregular, so results are mainly provided in tables of values for each type
of delay, categorized according to two delay duration classes and further split
into the 3 scenarios for each of the 12 aircraft types.
2.4.2 Analysis of the Performances
The EUROCONTROL Performance Review Commission publishes each
year the Performance Review Report (PRR), which presents a series of statis-
tics and indicators related to the previous year regarding the main Key Per-
formance Areas (KPAs) of Safety, Punctuality and Predictability, Capac-
ity/delays, Flight-Efficiency, Cost-Effectiveness and Environmental impact.
This constitutes since 1998 one of the most complete and reliable sources of
public-domain information regarding the performances of the ATS system in
Europe. According to the PRR 2008 (EUROCONTROL Performance Re-
view Commission, 2009), traffic in the European Statistics Reference Area
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reached 10.1 million general traffic movements of IFR flights in 2008 (60%
were traditional scheduled while 20%were low-cost flights). Despite the slow-
down of traffic increase which reduced from the average 5% annual value
observed in the period 2003-2007 to a 0.4% for the period 2007-2008, mainly
due to the economic downturn experienced in this last period, the record of
34105 daily movements was registered on June, 27th 2008.
According to CFMU figures there were approximately 28000 flights per
day on average during year 2008 and on average 5600 flights were regulated
daily through ATFM slots, thus producing an average daily delay of ap-
proximatively 65000 minutes, with peaks during the summer season of up to
111000 minutes (EUROCONTROL Central Flow Management Unit, 2009a)
EUROCONTROL Performance Review Commission (2009) states that
although the majority of European ACCs met or even exceeded their capac-
ity plans, the failure to deliver capacity as planned or inadequate plans in
a few ACCs negatively impacted the whole European network performance.
8% of flights were subject to en-route ATFM delays in 2008 thus producing
an average delay figure of 1.9 minutes per flight (for the summer period),
caused prevalently by inadequate capacity and shortage of ATC staff (76%
of the causes for en-route ATFM delays). This marked an increase with re-
spect to 2007, when the average delay per flight was 1.6 minutes, despite
the modest traffic increase. This was mainly due to global reduction in the
effective capacity experienced during 2008, which decreased for the first time
after 10 years. According to EUROCONTROL Performance Review Com-
mission (2009) this was caused prevalently by the lack of adequate ATC
staffing, preventing ACCs to open their maximum sector configuration at
peak hours. Consequently the gap between effective capacity and air traffic
demand continued to widen (cf. Fig.2.4.3). Similarly airport ATFM mea-
sures were an important cause of delay (11% of the primary causes of delay
in 2008, 32% of ATFM delays according to EUROCONTROL Central Flow
Management Unit, 2009a) and they were mostly caused (65%) by the 20 bus-
iest European airports. EUROCONTROL Performance Review Commission
(2009) estimates that en-route and airport ATFM delays combined caused
an aggregated cost to Airspace users of e1.5 Billions in 2008.
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Figure 2.4.3: Demand-capacity gap for en-route Airspace resources (source:
EUROCONTROL Performance Review Commission, 2009)
Besides average figures it is important to consider also standard deviation
relative to delay figures, since this gives a valuable indicator regarding the
predictability of ATS system, with a direct impact on the strategic costs of
delay (cf. Section 2.4.1.3). The standard deviation for the time variability
regarding general operations is 20 minutes according to EUROCONTROL
Performance Review Commission (2009); most of this variance was concen-
trated at the airport and it is mainly caused by delayed operations but also
by operations occurring earlier than their scheduled time. This is especially
verified for arrivals, since 20% of the occurrences were registered more than
7 minutes in advance. While from an airline perspective an early flight just
results in an opportunity cost due to under utilization of resources, from an
airport and ATC point of view, flights ahead of schedule can represent a man-
agement issue as much as delayed flights due to gate availability, variability
of traffic flows, etc.
Punctuality average levels for arrivals are similar in the U.S. and Eu-
rope, albeit with higher delay variability in the U.S.. This is mostly caused
by stronger weather disruptions but also by congestion at airports, whose
scheduled number of movements is closer to visual meteorological conditions,
causing higher delays when low visibility is experienced. The percentage of
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flights arriving on time coincides under the two systems, while remarkable
differences are registered for arrival punctuality figures. In Europe in fact
arrival and departure punctualities almost coincide, with very low variability
registered between scheduled and observed en-route duration. In the U.S. on
the contrary departure punctuality is significantly higher than punctuality at
arrival and this difference is attributable to en-route ATFM measures such
as MIT procedures (cf. Section 2.3.2).
EUROCONTROL Performance Review Commission (2009) concludes that
improvements in on-time performance and a reduction in variability require
a simultaneous tightening of airline, airport and ATM processes, and imply a
better coupling between them in the aviation network. Airspace is becoming
more and more congested, and traffic forecast will grow steadily over the next
15 years.
2.5 Reforming the Current ATM System
In the previous section it has been highlighted the strong impact on punc-
tuality and predictability of the current organization of Air Traffic Manage-
ment system. Delays are mainly due to structural limitations which cause a
lack of capacity hardly removable, for example runways at airports are major
constraints on airport capacity and their expansion could result complicate
if not impossible. However these structural limitations seem to be coupled
with inefficiencies in the use of the available capacity, under the current ATM
system architecture.
2.5.1 The Single European Sky Initiative
The Single European Sky (SES) represents an ambitious program under-
taken by the European Commission (EC) to solve these deficiencies with a
long-term strategy. It represents a legislative approach aimed to meet future
capacity and safety needs at a global European level rather than at local
one, with the objectives of restructuring the European airspace as a function
of air traffic flows, creating additional capacity and increasing the overall
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efficiency.
2.5.1.1 The SES I Package
The SES initiative was launched in 2000 by the EC following the severe
flight delays that were experienced in Europe in 1999. A High Level Group
was established, composed by representatives of the majority of stakeholders,
and the EC drafted a legislative package at the end of 2001, building on the
recommendations of its report, This first package, known as SES I, entered
into force in April 2004 and comprises four basic regulations, which pro-
vide the framework for the creation of additional capacity and for improved
efficiency and interoperability of the ATM system in Europe:
• The Framework regulation (EC No 549/2004) - laying down the frame-
work for the creation of the Single European Sky;
• The Service provision regulation (EC No 550/2004) - on the provision
of air navigation services in the Single European Sky;
• The Airspace regulation (EC No 551/2004) - on the organisation and
use of airspace in the Single European Sky;
• The Interoperability regulation (EC No 552/2004) - on the interoper-
ability of the European Air Traffic Management network.
The four basic regulations are complemented by more detailed imple-
menting rules adopted by the EC after discussion within the Single Sky
Committee. Industry is invited to advise the EC on actions to be taken on
the basis of the regulations through an Industry Consultation Body.
Member States are responsible for the correct implementation of the EC
rules. National Supervisory Authorities (which in practice coincide with
the national civil aviation authorities) have to make sure that services are
delivered to the highest standards in accordance with the legal requirements.
EUROCONTROL has the role of preparing various implementing rules
on the basis of mandates issued by the European Commission and in close
co-ordination with all relevant stakeholders. The final result of the mandate
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work is a report including a draft implementing rule. The European Com-
mission submits then the draft implementing rule under its responsibility to
the Single Sky Committee and adopts it following the favourable opinion of
the Committee.
2.5.1.2 The SES II Package and Functional Airspace Blocks
In October 2009, in response to strong demand from industry, Member
States and other stakeholders to simplify and increase the effectiveness of the
regulatory framework for aviation in Europe, the SES II package (Regulations
EC No 1070/2009, EC No 1108/2009) was adopted by the EC towards more
sustainable and better performing aviation. This amend the SES I package,
with the aim of improving the performance of air navigation services and net-
work functions in the Single European Sky, on the base of report submitted
in July 2007 by the High Level Group containing a set of recommendations
on how to improve the performance and governance of the European aviation
system. One of the main enhancements introduced with SES II is the estab-
lishment of performance targets in the fields of safety, capacity, flight and
cost efficiency and the environment subject to a periodic process of review,
monitoring and benchmarking based on key performance indicators for air
navigation services.
One of the key tools to achieve the performance targets, which has been
strengthened by SES II, is the process of integration of European national
airspaces in Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs), that will be configured as
macro volumes of airspace based on operational requirements and established
regardless of State boundaries, where the provision of air navigation services
and related ancillary functions are integrated.
The motivation behind the requirement of FABs implementation is the
fragmentation of the European system, resulting from the fact that air traffic
control has been historically associated with sovereignty and hence confined
within national borders. This fragmentation results today in a patchwork
of national systems, where 47 out of the total 69 ACCs operate with 10
sectors or fewer at maximum configuration thus being below their optimal
38 AIR TRAFFIC FLOW AND CAPACITY MANAGEMENT
economic size. The duplication of systems results in high costs of purchase,
maintenance and certification of equipments that are not inter-operable and
require increased coordination at the interfaces between them, resulting in
additional ATCOs workload for handover. Also the costs of research, training
and administration do not benefit from economies of scale. The overall order
of magnitude of the costs of fragmentation in the European ATM system
was estimated at some e880 Millions - e1,4 Billons (Helios Economics and
Policy Services, 2006). Thus FABs are considered key enablers for enhancing
cooperation between air navigation service providers in order to improve per-
formance and create synergies. This implies the institution of ATC systems
established by mutual agreement between all the Member States, irrespective
of national borders and designed to increase flight efficiency on the base of
traffic flows rather than State boundaries. The FAB concept was developed
in the SES I package in terms of configuration of the upper airspace as a con-
tinuum managed by a single ANSP or by a joint venture of ANSPs through
common systems and procedures. The institution of FABs has encountered
numerous hurdles after the adoption of SES I package, due to the complex
issues regarding national sovereignty and systems integration.
This has led EC to strengthen the requirement on the creation of FABs
through SES II, by requiring Member States to establish FABs by the end of
2012 at the latest and to designate one or more service providers that might
provide services also in a Member State other than that in which they have
their principal place of operation. Thus the focal point of FAB has been
moved from a simple configuration of upper airspaces into the integration
of service provisions. At the request of all Member States concerned with a
FAB project, the EC can designate a natural person as FAB coordinator in
order to facilitate negotiation process, to overcome difficulties and to speed
up the establishment of FABs. FAB implementation must be justified by
the overall added value, including optimal use of resources, on the basis of
cost-benefit analyses and supported by a safety case.
The process of FABs set up shall be facilitated by the European Network
Management Function (NMF) to ensure the convergence of national ATM
systems through the preparation of implementing rules and monitoring.
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Traffic Flow Management, in particular regarding slot coordination and
allocation, will be subject to regulation according to SES II. The imple-
menting rules shall include consistency between flight plans and airport slots
and the necessary coordination with adjacent regions, in accordance with
the recommendations contained in a previous EC communication (EC No
819-2006), stating that an appropriate balance between market-led solutions
(market mechanisms for slot allocation) and regulatory measures (Single Eu-
ropean Sky and airport safety oversight) must be sought to deal with the
expected capacity crunch;
The network management function more in general comprises a range
of tasks, exercised by different actors, whose modalities of execution will
be developed in implementing rules guaranteeing public interest impartiality
and ensuring appropriate industry involvement. These tasks will include:
• route network design;
• management of scarce resources through a centralised inventory;
• traffic flow management, in particular slot coordination and allocation
as a function of the required time of arrival.
The last bullet in particular is intended to enhance predictability and
ultimately the management of infrastructure elements in accordance with
the Single European Sky ATM Research Program (SESAR) proposals.
2.5.2 The SESAR Program
SESAR represents the technological and industrial component of the Sin-
gle European Sky, adopted in March 2004 to develop the new generation
ATM system capable of providing the technological leap required to keep
pace with the increasing air transport demand foreseen over the next 30
years, while ensuring the safety and fluidity of operations.
The SESAR project is organised in three phases. The definition phase
(2004-2008) has delivered the SESAR Master Plan (SESAR Consortium,
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2008) establishing the different technological stages, priorities and timeta-
bles. The second phase (2008-2013), managed by the SESAR Joint Under-
taking, concentrates efforts on the research and development activities that
will enable the development of the technologies which will underpin the new
generation of systems. The following deployment phase (2014-2020 and be-
yond) will embrace the production and implementation of the new ATM
infrastructure.
The SESAR Consortium, which carried out the definition phase study,
brought together for the first time in history the major stakeholders in Eu-
ropean aviation including airspace users, ANSPs, airport operators and the
supply industry (European and non-European), plus a number of associated
partners, including safety regulators, military organisations, staff associa-
tions (pilots, controllers and engineers) and research centres which worked
together with the significant expertise of EUROCONTROL.
The SESAR Concept of Operation is the result of a top-down approach
that led to the identification of an operational evolution road map starting
from five high level performance targets:
• Enable a 3-fold increase in capacity (w.r.t 2005 figures) which will also
reduce delays, both on the ground and in the air;
• Improve the safety performance by a factor of 10;
• Enable a 10% reduction in the effects flights have on the environment;
• Provide ATM services at a cost to the airspace users which is at least
50% less.
From these strategic performance targets, a number of Key Performance
Indicators (KPI) have been agreed in 11 Key Performance Areas (KPA), as
developed by ICAO, clustered into 3 groups:
• Societal KPAs: safety, security, environmental sustainability;
• Operational KPAs: capacity, cost effectiveness, efficiency, flexibility,
predictability;
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• Enablers KPAs: access and equity, participation, interoperability
The 11 KPAs constitute the base for the SESAR Performance Frame-
work which has been developed to define the axes along which benefits have
to be introduced by the program. The performance targets have been the
fundamental input for the development of a SESAR concept of operations
for 2020 as disclosed in SESAR Consortium (2007). This concept focuses on
global interoperability of the number of subsystems that compose the ATM
system, with user-driven management of flight trajectories in 4D (i.e. space
+ time), as well as on the exchange of relevant flight information between
all airborne and ground partners, in order to allow users to directly take in-
formed and non-imposed decisions, based on the most accurate and complete
information, whenever non-nominal situations occur. This concept has been
designed for compatibility with other worldwide initiatives, such as NextGen
in USA, in order to ensure global interoperability.
2.5.2.1 The Business Trajectory
The key concept to achieve SESAR performance targets is the new man-
agement of all operations based on the trajectory of the flight, in order to
execute each flight as close as possible to the intentions of its owner, i.e. the
airspace user. For commercial flights these intentions are specified in a Busi-
ness Trajectory (BT), with a required precision associated in all 4 dimensions
(i.e. space+time). Whenever ATM constraints need to be applied, including
those arising from infrastructural and environmental restrictions and regu-
lations, it will be the individual user who will find the best alternative BT
within these constraints, according to his internal business objectives. The
life cycle of the Business Trajectory starts in the long term phase, possibly
years before flight execution under the form of Business Development Trajec-
tory, which is not shared outside the Airspace User organisation. Once it has
reached a certain level of stability, it is made available to the ATM System
for planning purposes thus becoming Shared Business Trajectory, through
which potential discrepancies with network constraints might already be de-
tected and the Airspace Users will be notified with the request to adjust
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their BT. This process will be iterative and will rely on CDM mechanisms in
order to solve mismatches between demand and capacity and will ultimately
lead from the Shared Business Trajectory to the Reference Business Trajec-
tory (RBT), which is the trajectory that the Airspace User agrees to fly and
the ANSPs and Airports agree to facilitate; it represents the objective to be
achieved and will be progressively authorised during flight execution. Most of
the time indications contained in the RBT are estimates, however some may
be target times to facilitate planning and some of them may be constraints
to assist in particular in queue management when appropriate.
2.5.2.2 System Wide Information Management
The trajectory management concept entails the systematic exchange of
aircraft trajectory data between various participants in the ATM process,
which will be supported by a System Wide Information Management Sys-
tem (SWIM) enabling all participants to have access to a unique and accu-
rate source of data to plan and execute operations. SWIM will integrate
Air-Ground and Ground-Ground information sharing by the exchange of
real-time information between different actors belonging to the ATM sys-
tem, during all phases of flight, thus forming a connected ATM network
in which the nodes (including aircraft, AOCs, Airports, ACCs, etc.) can
provide and consume information. Such a system requires to shift from the
current point-to-point message exchange to the sharing of information within
a common virtual information pool, organized around a number of central
themes, called data domains, to separate different types of available infor-
mation (e.g. flight data, surveillance data, aeronautical data, meteorological
data, ATFCM data, etc.) (Trausmuth and Hirschberger, 2008).
2.5.2.3 Collaborative Decision Making
The SESAR Target Concept claims that, on the basis of common sit-
uational awareness enabled by SWIM, in the future ATM system Airspace
users will be fully involved in the process of demand and capacity balanc-
ing, through the implementation of ad-hoc collaborative processes. This will
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happen either during the agreements on adjustments to traffic demand or
individual trajectories when ANSPs and Airports cannot provide sufficient
capacity (i.e. the aforementioned modifications to Shared Business Trajec-
tory) or in the User Driven Prioritization Process (UDPP) which will be de-
signed to prioritise traffic queues caused by unexpected capacity shortfalls.
(SESAR Consortium, 2007) In particular SESAR states that the Airspace
users among themselves can recommend to the Network Management a pri-
ority order for flights affected by delays caused by an unexpected reductions
of capacity. The airspace users will respond in a collaborative manner to
the Network Management with a demand that best matches the available
capacity.
This implies the application of the Collaborative Decision Making princi-
ple (cf. Section 2.3.2) to the European Air Traffic Flow Management, which
has been limited so far just to Airport environment. Since 2001 in fact a
number of European Airports in collaboration with EUROCONTROL have
implemented methodologies and tools to increase the operational efficiency
of airport procedures, in particular the aircraft turn-round process, through
the sharing of accurate and timely information about available resources and
operational status of different partners such as Aircraft Operators, Air Traf-
fic Control, handling agents and the airport management. The main result
of the Airport CDM process is a very accurate calculation of the aircraft
Target Take Off Time (TTOT), which allows to build robust ground plan-
ning. However these benefits could be extended to the entire network if the
information available at a CDM Airport would be available also outside the
scope of the airport, in order to allow also en-route ATC and arrival airport
to be updated in advance about flight punctuality (Iagaru et al., 2009). Mu-
nich Airport is the first aerodrome in Europe which shares, since June 2007,
its local information with CFMU through the exchange of Departure Plan-
ning Information (DPI), that provides CFMU with a reliable estimate about
aircraft departure time, and Flight Update Messages (FUM), that provides
informs the airport about modifications in the estimated time of aircraft
arrival.
This collaborative management of flight updates forms a part of the sec-
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ond level of Airport CDM implementation, together with the calculation of
variable taxi times (EUROCONTROL, 2003). The full exploitation of Air-
port CDM potential lies however in the third level, which includes the collab-
orative pre departure sequence, as a fundamental process for the efficient use
of ground resources and the direct involvement of Aircraft Operators into the
departure sequencing moving away from the first-come-first-served principle.
Airport CDM has increased the involvement of aircraft operators and
of airport operations in the process of Air Traffic Management (ATM), im-
proving the predictability of events and enhancing efficiency in resources
utilisation, thus introducing benefits for all actors without requiring huge
investments (a benefit-to-cost ratio of 9 has been estimated in EUROCON-
TROL, 2008). To realise however all the potential benefits of the CDM
philosophy, a European-wide approach is necessary in the implementation of
the CDM elements as recognized by SESAR.
2.5.3 Contract-based Air Transportation System
One of the possible implementations of the Business Trajectory concept
proposed in SESAR, is the Contract of Objectives (CoO) investigated by
the Contract-based Air Transportation System (CATS) project. This is an
European project selected during the fourth call of the 6th EC Framework
Program for research and launched in November 2007 with a three year
duration. The main objective of the CATS Project is to experimentally
assess the operational validity the CoO.
The CATS Project hence provides a solution to the need of determining
“how to deal with business trajectories in the strategic, tactical and opera-
tional phases of flight”, as highlighted in SESAR Consortium (2006).
The CoO constitutes a formal and collaborative commitment between
the main actors involved in the flight operations (i.e. Airports, ANSPs and
Airline), that establishes a set of 4D windows, called Target Windows (TWs),
inside which each one engages in delivering its services to flight execution,
from gate to gate. This allows to define for each aircraft a number of TWs
located at the transfer of responsibility areas along flight trajectory (e.g.
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between 2 ACCs) with specific volume and temporal duration, determined
according to resource availability (e.g. capacity) and downstream constraints
(e.g. punctuality at the destination).
TWs are negotiated among actors starting from the long term planning
phase, when the first TWs, related to departure and arrival airports, are
defined on the base of airspace user demands and Airport resource plans. At
this phase no major changes are introduced with respect to the current sys-
tem, since the concept is consistent with the airport slot coordination process
(cf. Section 1.2.2). If there is no mismatch between demands and airport
resources, the initial plans are accepted, otherwise a negotiation process be-
gins between airports and users until satisfactory solutions are found. If an
agreement cannot be found between airspace users and airports, the network
management function can play the role of moderator, facilitator or decision
maker.
Once the initial plan is designed, the first phase concludes according to
SESAR and the BT changes its status from business development trajectory
to shared business trajectory. Accordingly the TWs related to departure and
arrival airports become public information and it is the time for ANSPs to
intervene in order to adapt the airspace structure and the working methods
to the airspace user demands. The purpose is to adjust the availability of
ANSP resources in order to avoid congestions and to fit users’ demand as
far as possible, in accordance with the SESAR Target Concept advocating
a collaborative refinement of the business trajectories (SESAR Consortium,
2007). ANSPs can thus build a resource plan on the basis of the business
trajectories, while a phase of negotiations between all the actors enables the
ultimate production of Reference Business Trajectory, which consists, in the
CATS operational view, in a collection of Target Windows located at each
transfer of responsibility area between actors.
Subsequently during the short term planning phase, the CoO is adapted
through the negotiation mechanism to the real situation occurring on the
day of operations, according to weather conditions which can be observed or
accurately predicted and to other disruptions until it is conclusively signed
just before aircraft push-back.
46 AIR TRAFFIC FLOW AND CAPACITY MANAGEMENT
Any divergence from this definitive CoO causing non-compliance with at
least one TW, due to either operational issues or to divergence from what
previously scheduled, still remains possible but triggers a specific decision-
making process at a system level, called renegotiation. This process is per-
formed by the involved actors, relying on SWIM network facilities, mini-
mizing data exchanged to avoid the saturation of the SWIM network. A
renegotiation proposing a revision of one or more TWs, may be proposed by
ANSP, airport, airline or aircrew. The revision of the TW shall be based
a CDM process involving all the concerned actors, whenever the time hori-
zon allows, and in particular letting the user decide according to its business
preferences. In certain cases, e.g. if the impact of renegotiation is observable
only by two neighboring ACCs, the process is limited to the impacted actors
and the outcome of the TW renegotiation process is then made available
through the SWIM network. Whenever the situation is urgent, the ATCOs
may decide to immediately and locally revise the trajectory for safety and
separation purposes, without applying a CDM process.
It is important to highlight that the CoO is not free from conflicts, hence
aircraft still need separation through ATC clearances which are supposed to
let aircraft cross its agreed TWs, unless unforeseen disruptions occur (e.g.
due to conflict resolution manoeuvres in a managed airspace). For this reason
TWs are defined as temporal and spatial intervals rather than points, since
this allow the tactical operations to unroll with a certain flexibility to ensure
resilience in case of disruption and conflict management. Stochasticity will
always be a component of the system hence the CATS concept proposes to
keep it under certain margins, by managing disruptions via the size of the
TWs and to limit the side effects of any divergence.
Through TWs in fact all actors can gain mutual awareness of each other
objectives and to monitor in real time the evolution of the pre-established
plans. At a conceptual level, the CoO and TWs can be regarded as an
operational way of achieving the establishment of the ATM performance
partnership recommended by SESAR Consortium (2006). TWs in fact ensure
a common translation and representation of the performance targets to be
achieved by the overall ATM chain.
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At a second more operational level, TWs unequivocally identify the trans-
fer of responsibility areas between partners, and at the same time they con-
stitute a way of managing uncertainty and monitoring disruptions. Measure-
ment of compliance with TWs established during the negotiation process
could represent a new and reliable metric for assessing the quality of a pro-
vided service.
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Chapter 3
The Central Resource
Allocation Problem in the
Context of ATFM
Previous chapters have described the set of resources required by Aircraft
Operators to perform a flight, which can be distinguished into internal (i.e.
aircraft, crew,...) and external, constituted by Airport facilities and Airspace
capacity. The availability, or rather the scarcity, of external resources have
an economical impact on the flight profitability, which is properly taken into
account by the AO during the planning phase, e.g. through the obtainment
of the proper airport slots. Decisions dictated by the availability of such re-
sources are made directly by the AO depending on its position on the market
and its business model. Conversely for Airspace resources the assignment is
currently decided by a central regulator on the base of a FPFS principle and
then imposed under the form of ATFM slots to flights, without considering
their economic impact on individual users affected. While this mechanism
is easy to implement and guarantees equity of treatment and fairness of
the assignment, it also creates a potential for improvement as recognized by
SESAR, which instead proposes to give individual users the power to make
decisions when ATM constraints need to be enforced.
This is also the fundamental concept at the base of CDM mechanisms em-
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ployed in the U.S., where the different nature of ATFM problem allowed for
introduction of slot-exchange mechanisms. Airspace users can take indepen-
dent actions (such as conditional cancellations under SCS, cf. Section 2.3.2.1)
to distribute delay among their flights as they prefer. The different nature
of European ATFM problem, where multiple regulations can be imposed on
a flight, does not permit a straightforward application of U.S. CDM appli-
cations such as Compression and SCS but demand for more complex mech-
anisms for slot exchanges.
In this chapter a number of auction-based models are developed that
could be employed at a tactical or pre-tactical level for establishing priorities
among flights subject to ATFM regulations, assuming that an adequate com-
munication network such as SWIM (cf. Section 2.5.2.2) enables the exchange
of information among stakeholders and that some airlines may be interested
in paying for delay reductions or receiving compensations for delay increases,
as already suggested by Vossen and Ball (2006b) and Ball et al. (2005).
3.1 Equity and Fairness in ATFM
When regulating air traffic, the ATFM authority has the obligation of as-
signing resources in the most equitable and impartial manner to users, that
must have equal rights to access to these resources independently on their
identities. In the context of resource allocation equity can be defined as a
state in which each user’s welfare is increased to the maximum extent pos-
sible, given the limited resources, after taking proper account of disparate
claims and individual circumstances (Hoffman and Davidson, 2003). The
most difficult part of this definition to implement is perhaps the concept of
taking in proper account different preferences, since preferences are subjec-
tively defined by the claimants.
The time estimates contained in the flight plan are currently taken as
representative of the individual user preference and employed to sequence
aircraft under the current FPFS principle.
However SESAR states that improved priority management alternatives
shall be provided to airspace users to satisfy their needs, going beyond the
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FPFS principle. These new priority rules are considered performance en-
ablers and included within the Equity KPA, and have to be applied in a
transparent and correct manner (EUROCONTROL, 2009).
Since money constitute a universal metric to define preferences we argue
that it could be employed also in the assignment of priorities in ATFM.
Moreover, since ATFM delays constitute a cost for aircraft operators that
depend on several factors (cf. Section 2.4.1.3), payments involved in the
implementation of a fair assignment can be directly comparable with the cost
of delay suffered. Hence a key assumption made in the rest of this thesis, is
that both utility derived by the assignment and the cost for achieving it are
measured in monetary units. This assumption implies that there are actually
two types of goods in the resource allocation settings we consider: the first
is the limited capacity and the second is money.
3.2 Literature Review
Different types of measures can be undertaken to solve congestion prob-
lems and they vary according to the time horizon necessary for their applica-
tion. Odoni (1987) provides the first systematic description of the different
categories of possible ATFM initiatives.
Long term solutions have a lookahead time from 5 to 10 years and include
the building of new infrastructure to accommodate traffic (e.g. runways,
airports) or the introduction of new standards for ATC (e.g. methodologies,
technologies). Their implementation usually requires high costs and could
result complicated or even impossible due to environmental constraints or
safety requirements.
Medium term measures have a planning horizon of 6 months to 2 years and
try to alleviate congestion by modifying spatial or temporal traffic patterns.
They can vary from strategic flow management actions discussed in chapter 2,
which are decided several months in advance based on traffic forecasts, to
the adoption of demand management policies for the assignment of Airport
resources. These latter can be either purely administrative as it is the case
for the strategic assignment of Airport slots (cf. Section 1.2.2) or purely
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economic, such as congestion pricing, or configured as a combination of them
(see Fan, 2004 for a thorough analysis).
Short term solutions are those adopted at a tactical level to guarantee
safety by avoiding congestion, essentially through ground holdings and re-
routing under the current European system. Ground holding practice, i.e.
the action of delaying a flight’s take-off beyond its scheduled departure time,
is motivated by the principle that delays on the ground are safer and less
costly than those in the air. Hence any forecast delay somewhere in the
system is anticipated at the departure airport prior to the take-off (Ball and
Lulli, 2004). Since re-routing cannot be imposed by CFMU and must be
accepted by Aircraft Operator, it requires some coordination activity and is
therefore less used than ground holding. The dynamic nature of the ATFM
slot allocation process requires it to be fast, reliable and equitable as it must
react to continuous changes in the environment to which it is applied.
3.2.1 Medium Term Measures to Manage Demand
Then it is not surprising that research efforts on demand management
have concentrated primarily on medium-term initiatives such as auctions and
congestion pricing, considered as alternative to administrative procedures for
the assignment of resources.
Rassenti et al. (1982) propose a sealed-bid type of combinatorial auction
(see Section 3.2.3.1 for a definition of different types of auctions) for the long-
term strategic allocation of airport slots in the U.S.. Such a system requires
a complete upfront revelation of airlines information in order to calculate
the allocation, while the revenues from the auction are collected by airports.
Authors recognize that this point can be matter for debate since airports
with limited capacity would rise their revenues by imputing rents on scarce
commodities. Donohue et al. (2003) propose the use of auctions to allo-
cate airport arrival slot to balance demand with capacity at slot-constrained
airports, while Le et al. (2004) formalize an auction model for the strate-
gic assignment of airport slot which combines economic and administrative
measures and provide a case study. Ball et al. (2005) observe that U.S.
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airport slots are scarce commodities with both a private and a common val-
ues. Then, to discover the slot market price, they suggests to allocate slots
through combinatorial auctions. They provide a thorough analysis of the
objectives and issues associated with slot auctions at different planning lev-
els, from the strategic to the tactical one. DotEcon Ltd. (2001) and more
recently NERA consulting (2004) provide an analysis of the effects of cur-
rent practices for the assignment of strategic airport slots in Europe and an
assessment of several potential market-based schemes.
Raffarin (2002) proposes a Vickerey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) sealed-bid type
of auction for the assignment of ATFM slots under the European system,
80% to be allocated in the strategic phase and the other 20% on the day
of operations. Author proves that such a mechanism achieve an efficient
allocation and allows the discovering of Airlines’ private values for resources.
Results are based on theoretical analysis without the support of simulations
due to lack of data.
One interesting point of VCG mechanisms is that they charge each partic-
ipant a price equal to the external cost caused on society. Congestion pricing
theory is based on this same fundamental principle, which is achieved through
a different mechanism, since there are no predefined slots and each flight is
free to schedule operations as long as it pays an appropriate congestion fee.
This toll forces users to internalize the external cost they cause. A number
of studies deals with the problems of determining appropriate landing fees
to manage congestion at airports (Levine, 1969, Daniel, 1995, Hansen, 2002)
or in the en-route airspace (Andreatta and Odoni, 2003).
However Schank (2005) argues that institutional barriers may prevent
effective implementation of congestion pricing at airports and provides sev-
eral case studies as a support. In particular 2 cases presented show that
a particular group of aircraft was discriminated by the toll charging policy
and this led to a substantial opposition which caused its dissolution. This
demonstrates that political and social equity problems may eventually pre-
vent the adoption of congestion pricing schemes, if adequate alternatives are
not provided to the displaced passengers.
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3.2.2 Short Term Measures to Manage Demand
Following the seminal work of Odoni (1987), a number of researchers
have focused their activity on the development of optimization models and
algorithms for the assignment of ground delays as a short-term measure to
regulate traffic flows. The problem of assigning ground delays to a set of
flights in order to minimize an aggregated cost function, given airport capac-
ity constraints, is known as Ground Holding Problem (GHP).
In its basic version the GHP assumes that only one airport in the system
is subject to capacity constraints which are imposed only on arrival flights.
This problem is referred to as the Single Airport Ground Holding problem
(SAGHP) and has been formulated for different cases.
Andreatta and Romanin-Jacur (1987) analyze and solve the problem with
a dynamic programming algorithm for a single time period and one airport
subject to a capacity limit which is a random variable whose distribution
is known. Terrab and Odoni (1993) formulate the problem as a minimum
cost network flow for the multi-period deterministic case in which the future
airport capacity profile is determined in advance. They also extend the algo-
rithm proposed in Andreatta and Romanin-Jacur (1987) to the multi-period
case with stochastic capacities and propose several heuristics to achieve ap-
proximate solutions due to the complexity of the exact dynamic programming
approach.
Richetta and Odoni (1993) extend these results by presenting a stochastic
linear programming solution to the static version of SAGHP. Hoffman and
Ball (2000) propose a variant of SAGHP by adding banking constraints that
force sets of flights to be temporally grouped in order to allow the transfer of
passengers, baggages and crews for aircraft operating under a hub-and-spoke
system (cf. Section 1.2.1).
Dell’Olmo and Lulli (2003) formulate a dynamic programming algorithm
that optimally allocates airport capacity to both arrival and departure flights,
using the concept of capacity envelope according to which arrival and depar-
ture capacities are interdependent and connected by a convex piecewise-linear
functional relationship.
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In the case a network of airports is considered and propagation of de-
lay can occur between successive flights, the problem of determining indi-
vidual flight delays to minimize the total delay cost is referred to as the
Multi Airport Ground Holding problem (MAGHP). Under this general case
the problem is typically modeled through an integer program that increases
computational burden with respect to the SAGHP. This latter in fact can be
encoded through a pure linear program giving integer solutions due to the
total-unimodular constraint matrix associated.
Vranas et al. (1994a) first proposed several exact formulations as well as
an heuristic for the static deterministic version of the MAGHP. An extension
to the dynamic stochastic case is provided in Vranas et al. (1994b).
A further extension of the MAGHP is the one that also includes con-
straints on the capacities of en-route sectors of airspace and determines opti-
mal speed adjustments of aircraft, besides their release time into the network.
This is known as Air Traffic Flow Management problem (TFMP). Bertsimas
and Stock Patterson (1998) formulate an integer program with binary vari-
ables for the deterministic version of the TFMP, which also includes the
rerouting option since each flight has a pre-determined set of routes avail-
able. Authors prove that their formulation is NP-hard, however in many
practical cases the linear programming relaxation of the integer problems
yields integer optimal solutions and is solvable in polynomial time, hence
it is computationally efficient. This is due to the fact that several of the
constraints in the model provide facets of the convex hull of solutions.
Bertsimas and Stock Patterson (2000) consider an extension of the TFMP
problem in which aircraft can be dynamically rerouted through the system.
Their model is formulated as a dynamic, multi-commodity, integer network
flow model with side constraints, whose solutions indicate aggregate flows
obtained by solving a lagrangian relaxation of the linear program in which
capacity constraints are dualized. Successively a rounding heuristic is em-
ployed to decompose aggregate flows into a set of individual flight paths and
finally an integer packing problem is solved to obtain individual flight routes.
Bertsimas et al. (2008) extend the model in Bertsimas and Stock Pat-
terson (1998) by adding routing decision capabilities to it. This is achieved
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through a compact formulation based on a description of the overall network
as a directed graph, where nodes represent capacity constrained elements
and arcs define their sequence relations.
Alonso et al. (2000) formulate the TFMP through two versions of a
stochastic model based on a multistage scenario approach, which extend the
deterministic model of Bertsimas and Stock Patterson (1998).
Lulli and Odoni (2007) formulate a deterministic model for the optimal
assignment of delays to flights in order to guarantee the respect of airports’
and sectors’ capacities under the European system. They show that under
particular circumstances, due to the complex traffic flows interactions gen-
erated by en-route airspace capacities, the assignment of airborne delay in
addition to ground delay can be beneficial.
The common characteristic of all these models is the the presence of
a unique central decision maker, the ATFM authority, which in charge of
assigning individual delays to flights in order to minimize a global objective
function, obtained by aggregating the direct operating costs caused to all
regulated flights by ATFM restrictions. This approach is consistent with
the current mode of operations of the European ATFM system, where the
CFMU centrally calculates and impose ground holdings to flights according
to a FPFS heuristic. This criteria for delay assignment does not consider
the cost caused to users, which can be correctly estimated only by individual
airlines depending on their internal priorities and business models.
This principle is at the base of the Collaborative Decision Making program
undertaken by the FAA to partially decentralize decision making regarding
the assignment of ground delays to flights (cf. Section 2.3.2.1). The CDM im-
plementation in the U.S. system allows airlines to exert active control on their
aircraft, by providing incentives to share up-to-date information and to co-
operate in determining resource allocation. Vossen and Ball (2006a) demon-
strate that the inter-airline slot exchange procedure implemented through the
Compression algorithm (cf. Section 2.3.2.1) can be interpreted as a mediated
bartering, in which the FAA acts as a “broker”, matching offers proposed by
the airlines.
The idea behind the Compression algorithm is to reward airlines for slots
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they release, thus encouraging airlines to report cancellations.
3.2.3 The Use of Auctions in Resource Allocation
Auctions constitute protocols that use the preference expressed by par-
ticipants to determine an allocation of resources and a set of respective pay-
ments. Auctions provide a tool to allocate resources more efficiently than
other mechanisms and have been used in a variety of settings where self-
interested agents compete over the allocation of goods. The most important
auctions applications include spectrum allocation in several countries all over
the world (see Banks et al., 2003; Grimm et al., 2003), electricity supply (see
de Castro et al., 2008; Elmaghraby, 2005), procurement of goods in industrial
settings (Bichler et al., 2005; Hohner et al., 2003), allocation of bus routes
(Bichler et al., 2005) and online advertisement positioning (Edelman et al.,
2007). Auctions have also been proposed by researchers for bandwidth allo-
cation (Maille and Tuffin, 2004), scheduling problems (Wellman et al., 2001;
Kutanoglu and Wu, 1999) and also for the specific problem of resources in
ATM as illustrated in Section 3.2.1.
3.2.3.1 Types of Auctions
The literature on auctions identifies a wide variety of auction types that
I will briefly outline here. The interested reader can refer to Krishna (2009)
and the literature cited therein, for a complete description of auction theory.
The single-good type constitutes the most familiar class of auctions, where
there is one seller, multiple potential buyers and one unique good for sale.
These auctions are called single-sided, since there are multiple agents only
on one side of the market. The open outcry English auction is the oldest and
perhaps most prevalent auction format, according to which an auctioneer
announces a starting price for the item and increases it incrementally until
it remains only one bidder interested. As soon as the last bidder remains
alone in the bidding process, it is assigned the object and pays the price
announced, at which the second last bidder refuses to stay. Hence the price
the winner has to pay equals the second highest bid from which it inherits
58 THE CENTRAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
the classification as second-price auction.
The Vickrey auction is a second-price auction in which each bidder sub-
mits its bid to the auctioneer privately, thus preventing other bidders from
knowing the amount. The bidder submitting the highest bid is assigned the
item and pays a price equal to the next highest bid (i.e. the highest rejected
bid). This is known as a second-price, sealed-bid type of auction.
A sealed bid type of auction where the highest bid is assigned the item
and pays a price equal to its bid is known as first-price auction.
A first-price open outcry auction is the Dutch auction, in which the auc-
tioneer first calls out a price and decreases this price incrementally until the
first bidder is willing to accept it, thus being assigned the item and having
to pay this bid.
Under the assumption that all agents are risk neutral and have private
statistically independent values drawn from the same distribution, Vickrey
(1961) proves that the revenues under all these auction formats are equiv-
alent. Myerson (1981) generalizes this result of revenue equivalence to all
auction formats that are allocative efficient, i.e. those implementing a solu-
tion that maximizes the sum of bidders’ utilities over all allocations.
A quite different setting is the one in which there are multiple items that
have to be sold by an auctioneer. In the case that there is still only one kind
of good available and the different items are identical copies of that good
the auction is known as multiunit. A number of different cases is grouped
under this category, depending on the characteristics of individual demands
(either for single units or multiple units) and supply (limited or unlimited).
Usually in multiunit auction theory it is assumed that the marginal value of
an additional unit for buyer decreases with the number of units they receive.
Differently when the items auctioned are not identical but constitute a va-
riety of different goods available in the same market, combinatorial auctions
are used to assign them. They are employed for example when auctioning
paths in networks as bidders can express complex bids on packages of items
which are valuable only if acquired together, since a path might be useless if
incomplete.
In two-sided auctions instead there are many buyers and sellers who trade
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in a market and both bids (i.e. offers to purchases) and asks (i.e. offers
to sells) are allowed. A typical example is the stock market, where many
agents interact to buy and sell different stocks. In the particular case that
all agents trade many units of the same identical good (e.g. the shares of a
given company), the auction is called double auction. The main subclasses of
double auctions are the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) and the periodic
double auction, which differ in the timing of trades occurrence. In CDA
bids and offerings are matched immediately as they are revealed, while in
the periodic double auction trades occur at some predetermined time, when
the maximal amount of trade is computed on the base of the bids previously
received.
Combinatorial exchanges are particular double auctions in which multiple
buyers and sellers trade different heterogeneous goods. This type of mech-
anisms constitute a perfect candidate for application in Air Traffic Flow
Management problems, where there are several competing airlines and the
reallocation of different resources demands for complex trading combinations
to fully achieve economic efficiency.
3.3 Definition of the Problem
As already highlighted in section 3.1, we assume that both the utility
derived by the assignment of ATFM resources and the cost for achieving it
can be measured in monetary units and this utility is transferable among
Aircraft Operators under the form of payments. While any type of currency
can be adopted we employ Euro (e) for simplicity of treatment. Hence there
are two types of goods in the resource allocation settings we consider: the first
is the limited capacity and the second is money. We rely on TW concept
defined in Section 2.5.3 to support a clear and practical extension of the
actual assignment of ATFM capacity. By restricting TWs uniquely on their
temporal dimension, they represent time slots that allow to explicitly allocate
network resources to users whenever there is mismatch between demand and
capacity. With a slight abuse of terminology we use the terms allocation and
assignment as synonyms.
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Our purpose is to find a mechanism for the assignment TWs that, besides
guaranteeing safety by adopting the same definition of capacity employed
today, it satisfies some of the following desirable properties commonly used
in mechanism design (see Krishna, 2009 for a formal treatment):
1. Allocative efficiency: if utility is transferable among all agents, a mech-
anism that maximizes the sum of individual utilities (i.e. the sum of
utilities calculated from the values communicated to the auctioneer) is
called allocative efficient. Thus an an exchange mechanism which is
allocative efficient maximize the total increase in value over all agents.
Pareto efficiency property instead, implies that the mechanism attain
an allocation, for which no other allocation exists, that makes at least
one agent better off without making at least one agent worse off. Alloca-
tive efficiency can be defined in an ex-post and ex-ante sense. Ex-ante
efficiency takes preferences over expected allocations in consideration,
whilst ex-post analyzes preferences over realized allocations.
2. Incentive compatibility: Incentive compatibility refers to the validity
of the information communicated by agents to the auctioneer (i.e. the
values attached by a flight f to a certain allocation j). A mechanism is
incentive compatible if the equilibrium strategy for agents is to report
their preferences truthfully. Agents may have an incentive to untruth-
fully report their preferences in order to increase their individual utility.
3. Individual rationality: this property requires that the utility after par-
ticipating in the mechanism is higher than before for all participating
agents. Otherwise the agent would decide not to take part in the mech-
anism.
4. Budget balance: a mechanism is said to be strictly budget balanced
if the amount of prices sums up to 0 over all agents. In this case the
mechanism neither requires payments from outside (i.e. there is no sub-
sidization requirement) nor generate a surplus, but just redistributes
the payments among the agents. Budget balance property implies that
the resource allocation can be performed at no costs. A mechanism is
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weakly budget balanced if it can potentially produce a surplus, i.e. the
global amount of prices sums up to a positive quantity.
An ideal mechanism would verify all the above properties, it would achieve
a minimal cost assignment computed on the base of truthful information
communicated by agents and it would guarantee that every participants is
better-off without requiring external subsidization. Unfortunately the impos-
sibility theorem by Myerson and Satterwhite (1983) states that no mechanism
can satisfy at the same time incentive compatibility, individually rationality,
budget balance and efficiency at the equilibrium. In the following we thus
relax the incentive compatibility constraint in order to guarantee a mech-
anism that is individual rational and budget balance and that implements
the efficient allocation according to the reported information. We thus make
the assumption that participants are price-takers, i.e. they do not declare
untruthful valuations to modify prices at their advantage.
3.4 Mathematical Description of the Prob-
lem
Let F = {1, ..., F} be the set of flights subject to ATFM regulations
during a certain period T = [Tmin;Tmax] and S = {1, ..., S} a set of sectors
and airports which are regulated (capacity constrained) during T . Each flight
f ∈ F is expected to cross a sequence of elements Sf ⊆ S according to its
flight plan, hence it will need to be assigned a time slot for each s ∈ Sf .
This is an extension of the system employed today for the European
ATFM, under which just one departure ATFM slot is assigned to flight f ,
according to its most penalizing regulation. This extension is in line with the
Target Window concept proposed by CATS (cf. Section 2.5.3), if we restrict
the 4 dimensions of TW (i.e. space+time) just to the time. Hence in the
following we use the term TW to indicate a time slot assigned to a flight
on each regulated resource (e.g. airport, en-route sector, ecc.) it planned to
cross, to balance global demand with the available capacity.
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According to the CFMU definitions (EUROCONTROL Central Flow
Management Unit, 2009b), a regulated resource s ∈ S, with capacity limited
to K entries per hour from st time to end time, has an associated Slot Al-
location List Ls = [1, ..., Ns]. Each time slot j = [Ij, Uj] ∈ Ls represents a
TW having capacity of one flight where:
Ns =
⌊
end time− st time
60
K
⌋
Ij =
⌊
st time+ (j − 1) · 60
K
⌋
with j ∈ {2, ..., Ns}
Uj = Ij+1 − 1 with j ∈ {1, .., Ns − 1},
and I1 = st time, UN = end time.
Each Flight Plan indicates an estimated time of entry into each element
s ∈ Sf traversed by flight f , i.e. Esf . Then f is allocated a list of TWs
qf = [TW1, .., TW|Sf |], where TWi is the TW assigned on the i
th element of
Sf and can not be earlier than E
i
f since flights cannot be anticipated, i.e.
Eif ≤ UTWi for all TWi ∈ qf .
We assume that for each flight f ∈ F , if |Sf | > 1 then the flying time
between pairs of consecutive resources, (i, j) with i, j ∈ Sf and j = i + 1, is
fixed. This implies that |ITWj − ITWi | ≤ Ejf − Eif ≤ |UTWj − UTWi |.
An assignment q will cause a positive delay to flight f if and only if
Eif < ITWi for some TWi ∈ q and the amount of delay will be:
dqf =
 maxi∈Sf (ITWi − E
i
f ) if E
i
f ≤ ITWi ∀i ∈ Sf
0 otherwise
Hence each TW assignment q to a flight f implies a nonnegative cost
of delay C(f, q) ≥ 0, which depends on the amount of delay itself and on
the flight receiving the delay. We consider the cost C(f, q) as a non-linear
increasing function of delay dqf , bounded form below by C(f, q) = 0 when
dqf = 0.
An assignment q is feasible for flight f if and only if (i) it contains one
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TW for each i ∈ Sf and each pair (i, j) of consecutive TW is connected by
the fixed flying time Ejf − Eif , (ii) it assigns a nonnegative delay to f and
(iii) the delay it assigns is bounded, i.e. dqf < MaxDelf where MaxDelf is a
fixed parameter for each flight beyond which the flight prefers to be canceled.
We indicate with Qf the set of all TW assignments that are feasible for
flight f .
A pair of consecutive flights (f, f ′) ∈ F such that f ′ follows f , can be
merged to form a unique flight f ′′ such that Sf ′′ = Sf ∪ Sf ′ and the airport
turnaround time is defined by E1f ′ − E|Sf |f .
3.5 The Single Capacity Constrained Resource
Case
We consider first the particular case in which there is a unique capacity
constrained resource s, and all flights f ∈ F compete for TWs on this re-
source. The minimal cost assignment of TWs to flights is then obtained by
solving the following problem:
min
∑
f∈F
∑
k∈Qf
C(f, k)x(f, k) (1a)
subject to ∑
f∈F|k∈Qf
x(f, k) ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ Ls (1b)∑
k∈Qf
x(f, k) = 1 ∀f ∈ F (1c)
x(f, k) ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F , k ∈ Qf . (1d)
The objective function (1a) minimizes the aggregated cost of delay caused
by the regulation, subject to the constraints that each target window k ∈ Ls
can be assigned at most to one flight (1b), and all flights affected by the
regulation must have a TW allocated (1c). The variable x(f, k) is equal
to 1 if and only if flight f is allocated to TW j, and 0 otherwise. This
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is guaranteed by constraints (1d), since the integrality of the the decision
variables x(f, k) is ensured by the particular structure of problem (1) as an
assignment problem, also referred to as the bipartite weighted matching (see
Papadimitriou and Steiglitz, 1998). This is due to the total unimodularity
property of the constraints’ matrix associated with the problem, implying
that all the basic feasible solutions are integer and equal either 0 or 1.
In the case that all flights have the same unitary cost of delay, an allo-
cation xF obtained by applying the FPFS principle is optimal for problem
(1).
Theorem 1. If C(f, k) = dkf for all f ∈ F , k ∈ Ls, a TW allocation xF
obtained with FPFS rule, which sorts flights f ∈ F by ascending value of
Ef and allocates each flight to the first available TW, is optimal for problem
(1).
Proof. By closing parallel with the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Vossen and Ball,
2006a where all TW are composed by only one unit of time, i.e., Ij = Uj ∀j ∈
Ls. Suppose without loss of generality that Efi < Efj for all fi, fj ∈ F .
Suppose A1 is an assignment obtained by solving problem (1) and A2 is an
assignment obtained by FPFS, then the flight assigned to the first TW in Ls
(TW1) must be the same. Otherwise it means that A2 assigns TW1 to a flight
fi while A1 assigns TW1 to a different flight fj 6= fi and assigns another TW
TWk to fi with i, k > 1. Then the A2 assignment implies that Efi < Efj but
this contradicts the optimality A1 which could be improved by exchanging fi
with fj. The same argument can be applied to the remaining TW ∈ Ls.
Thus in the special case of a single capacity constrained resource, the
FPFS policy produces an allocation of TWs to flights that minimizes the
global delay. However if we weigh delays by the specific unitary costs of
delay suffered by flights, theorem (1) does not hold anymore. In this case
to achieve the cost-minimizing assignment, problem (1) should be solved
with weights C(f, k) which can be estimated by aircraft operators and then
communicated to a central authority in charge of solving the problem.
Under this scenario however there would obviously be an incentive for
users to declare weights Ĉ(f, k) > C(f, k), higher than true value in order
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to receive a less penalizing assignment. To avoid this issue aircraft operators
could be charged, on the basis of the values reported, an appropriate price
p(k∗) for the TW k∗ assigned by solving problem (1) with weights Ĉ(f, k)
declared by users. Prices p(k∗) could be calculated by solving the following
problem dual to (1):
max
∑
f∈F
u(f)−
∑
k∈Ls
p(k) (2a)
subject to
u(f)− p(k) ≤ C(f, k) ∀f ∈ F , k ∈ Qf (2b)
p(k) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ Ls (2c)
We assume in the following that the total cost of a TW assignment k for
each flight is represented by a quasilinear function composed by the sum of
the cost of delay caused by the TW k plus the price paid for being assigned
the specific TW. Hence the optimal dual variables u∗(f) and p∗(k∗) represent
respectively for each flight f ∈ F the total cost and price for the optimal
assignment k∗, since u∗ = p∗(k∗) +C(f, k∗) for the complementary slackness
condition.
Optimal prices p∗ have the property of being market clearing, i.e. no
flight prefers to be assigned another TW j 6= k∗ and being charged the
correspondent price p∗(j), since this would imply a higher cost. This can
be easily proven by considering that at the optimum, due to complementary
slackness conditions it is p∗(k∗) + C(f, k∗) ≤ p∗(j) + C(f, j) for all f ∈
F , j 6= k∗ ∈ Qf . At the same time the incentive for declaring Ĉ(f, k) >
C(f, k) would be removed since a flight could end up paying a higher price
p̂∗(k̂∗) > p∗(k∗). Moreover Leonard (1983) proves that by charging prices
p∗ (the minimal set in case of multiple dual solutions) not only there is no
incentive to misrepresent, but also that the surplus from telling the truth is
always at least as great as that from lying, thus these prices are incentive
compatible.
However it should be noted that by charging flights a price for TW as-
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signed could be perceived as unfair by users. Compared with the FPFS
allocation currently implemented, some flights could gain a better position
and being charged accordingly, some others might increase their delay and
additionally face a payment. In fact let us indicate A = {a1, ..., aF} the as-
signment of TWs to flights obtained through FPFS, for each f ∈ F the cost
of delay caused by this assignment is C(f, af ). On the other hand by impos-
ing the auction mechanism composed by the optimal assignment for problem
(1) with payments optimal for its dual problem (2) the cost experienced by
each flight f ∈ F becomes p∗(k∗) + C(f, k∗) and there is not guarantee that
p∗(k∗) + C(f, k∗) < C(f, af )
To ensure that all participants are better off after the implementation of
the optimal assignment, we propose to start from the current FPFS assign-
ment and to consider it as the initial endowment guaranteed to all flights.
This implies that a first TW assignment A = {a1, ..., aF} is implemented ac-
cording to the current FPFS mechanism, and these allocation is considered
as a baseline asset at flights’ disposal. Subsequently the optimal exchange of
TWs among flights is calculated by solving the following problem:
max
∑
f∈F
∑
k∈Qf
[C(f, af )− C(f, k)] · x(f, k) (3a)
subject to ∑
f∈F|k∈Qf
x(f, k) ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ Ls (3b)∑
k∈Qf
x(f, k) = 1 ∀f ∈ F (3c)
x(f, k) ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F , k ∈ Qf . (3d)
Instead of minimizing the cost of the assignment, we look for the exchange
of TWs among flights of maximal value, where V (f, k) = [C(f, af )−C(f, k)]
is the value obtained by flight f by exchanging its FPFS assigned TW af
with the optimal TW k. It will be V (f, k) > 0 if the delay caused by TW q
is lower than delay caused by af , V (f, k) < 0 otherwise.
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The assignment obtained by solving problem (3) is the same minimal-
cost assignment obtained by solving problem (1), since they share all con-
straints, the term
∑
f∈F
∑
k∈Qf C(f, af ) · x(f, k) in the objective function
(3a) is a constant due to constraints (3c) and maximizing the remaining
part
∑
f∈F
∑
k∈Qf [−C(f, k)] · x(f, k) is equivalent to the objective function
(1a). Hence the minimal cost assignment corresponds to the maximum value
exchange. The dual problem becomes:
min
∑
f∈F
u(f) +
∑
k∈Ls
p(k) (4a)
subject to
u(f) + p(k) ≥ [C(f, af )− C(f, k)] ∀f ∈ F , k ∈ Qf (4b)
p(k) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ Ls (4c)
If each flight f ∈ F is charged a price p∗(k∗) for the optimal assignment
x(f, k∗) and is compensated by p∗(af ) for the relinquished TW previously
assigned by FPFS, its cost after the exchange becomes C(f, k∗) + p∗(k∗) −
p∗(af ), while the initial cost of delay after FPFS is C(f, af ). We prove that
each flight f ∈ F can only reduce its cost of assignment by exchanging TW
af with optimal TW k
∗ at prices p∗:
Property 1. The cost reduction r(f) = C(f, af )−C(f, k∗)−p∗(k∗)+p∗(af )
obtained by each flight f ∈ F by purchasing TW k∗ optimal for problem (3)
at the dual price p∗(k∗) and selling its FPFS assigned TW af at the dual
price p∗(af ) is always non negative.
Proof. Due to complementary slackness conditions at optimum it is u∗(f) +
p∗(k∗) = [C(f, af )−C(f, k∗)], while u∗(f)+p∗(j) ≥ [C(f, af )−C(f, j)] ∀f ∈
F , j 6= k∗ ∈ Qf . Hence r(f) = C(f, af )− C(f, k∗)− p∗(k∗) + p∗(af ) ≥ 0 for
an af ∈ Qf with af 6= k∗.
The optimal exchange for problem (3) is thus Individual Rational, since
every participant will have a non negative cost reduction by implementing
it, i.e. a profit with respect to not participating in the exchange.
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If problem (3) admits at least one feasible solution, i.e. there are enough
TW k ∈ Ls to implement a feasible allocation to all flights f ∈ F , there is
at least one optimal exchange that is strictly Budget Balanced, i.e. all the
payments made and received by participants sum up to zero. The following
two lemmas are necessary to prove that the exchange is also budget balanced.
Lemma 1. For every TW allocation K∗ optimal for problem (3) and TW
allocation A obtained by applying FPFS algorithm on the same set of flights
F , a TW k ∈ Ls which is not assigned in A is neither assigned in K∗.
Proof. By contradiction. Let us assume that jˆ is the first empty TW not
assigned in A, but allocated inK∗. Let FA, respectively FK
∗
, be the set of the
flights allocated to the TW 1, . . . , jˆ in A, respectively in K∗. The minimality
of jˆ guarantees that FK
∗\FA 6= ∅. Then consider a flight fˆ ∈ FK∗\FA. In A,
flight fˆ is allocated to a TW lˆ > jˆ. Define the allocation xˆA = {xˆA1i, ..., xˆAFj}
such that
xˆAfj =

0 if j = lˆ and f = fˆ
1 if j = jˆ and f = fˆ
xK
∗
fj otherwise
.
That is, xˆA induces the same TW allocations of A except for flight fˆ which
is allocated to TW jˆ instead of lˆ. The feasibility of A and the fact that fˆ
is allocated to TW jˆ in K∗ imply the feasibility of xˆA. Also the cost caused
by xK
∗
is strictly greater than the corresponding cost of xˆA as Efˆ ≤ Ujˆ < Ilˆ.
This in contradiction with the optimality of K∗, hence we cannot assume
that jˆ is not assigned in xA, but it is xK∗. An analogous argument proves
that we cannot assume that jˆ is empty in xK∗, but is allocated in xA. Then,
we must conclude that jˆ cannot exist.
The above lemma implies that any TW allocated under the FPFS policy
is also allocated, possibly to a different flight, under the optimal exchange.
An important consequence of Lemma 1 is that the generic asymmetric
assignment problem (3) can be decomposed into a set of smaller symmetric
assignment problems. To prove this last statement, we need to introduce the
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following notation. Let i and l be two empty TW in xF such that Ui < Il.
We define as BAil ⊆ Ls (respectively BK∗il ⊆ Ls) the set of TW allocated
in A (respectively in K∗) between the empty TW i and l. Let FAil ⊆ F
(respectively FK
∗
il ⊆ F) be the corresponding set of flights assigned to the
BAil (respectively B
K∗
il ) TW.
Lemma 2. For every TW allocation K∗ optimal for problem (3) and TW
allocation A obtained by applying FPFS algorithm on the same set of flights
F , if i and l are two empty TW in A such that Ui < Il and no other empty
TW exists between i and l, then a flight is assigned a TW between i and l
in A if and only if it is assigned a TW between the same empty ones i and l
also in K∗, that is BK
∗
il = B
A
il and F
K∗
il = F
A
il .
Proof. From Lemma 1, it follows that BK
∗
il = B
A
il . Let f ∈ FAil be a flight
allocated to TW h in BAil , i.e. Ih > Ui and Uh < Il. It follows that Ef > Ui,
otherwise TW i would be assigned to flight f . Hence also in K∗ flight f
cannot be assigned a TW earlier than i. Similarly no flight assigned to a
TW later than l can receive a TW h earlier than l, hence flight f cannot
be postponed in K∗ to any free TW later than l. Thus, if in K∗ TW h is
assigned to a flight preceding TW i in A, it follows that there must be an
empty TW in K∗ that was not empty in A, and this contradicts Lemma 1.
Hence, we must have that FK
∗
il = F
A
il . A symmetric argument holds for the
only if part of the statement.
The above Lemma 2 implies that the optimal TW exchange obtained by
solving problem (3) on F and Ls can be obtained by solving problem (3)
on subset of TW consecutive allocated by FPFS on the respective group of
receiving fights. Or equivalently the solution of the asymmetric assignment
problem (3) is found by solving a sequence of smaller symmetric assignment
problems, one for each set ot TW BAil and flights F
A
il .
A further consequence of Lemma 2 is that the exchange is budget bal-
anced.
Property 2. The exchange mechanism that assigns to every f ∈ F the TW
k∗f ∈ Ls optimal for problem (3), charges the dual price p∗(k∗f ) for it and
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refund the dual price p∗(af ) for the FPFS released TW is strongly budget
balanced.
Proof. The statement is an immediate consequence of the fact that FK
∗
il =
FAil for any pair of TW i and l considered in Lemma 2. This implies that
no flight f ∈ FAil cedes its FPFS assigned TW to the auctioneer, neither
any flight f ∈ FAil acquires a TW that was unassigned by FPFS from the
auctioneer. The flights just sell and buy TW to and from each others.
Hence the exchange is coordinated by a benevolent auctioneer, which
does not have ant profit by participating in the mechanism, neither has to
subsidize it.
Another consequence of Lemma 2 is that, from a game theoretic perspec-
tive, we can describe the exchange mechanism as a permutation game (Tijs
et al., 1984). This is a particular type of coalitional game with transferable
utility (i.e. a TU game) described by the pair (F ; θ) where F is our set of
flights and θ : 2F → R is the characteristic function:
θ(D) =
∑
f∈D
C(f, af )− min
pi∈ΠD
∑
f∈D
C(f, pi(f))
for all subsets D ⊂ F , with D 6= ∅ and θ(∅) = 0, where C(f, af ) is the
cost suffered by flight f for being assigned TW af , ΠD is the class of all
D-permutations and C(f, pi(f)) the cost suffered by flight f for being as-
signed TW originally assigned to pi(f). The characteristic function θ(D)
represents the maximal cost saving that the coalition D can obtain by be-
ing assigned the optimal TW compared to the situation in which every
player receives the FPFS TW af . In the TU game (F ; θ) a payoff allocation
p = (r(1), r(2), . . . , r(F )) is the vector of the amounts of profits allocated to
each player. A payoff allocation is individually rational if r(f) ≥ θ({f}) for
all f ∈ F , it is efficient if ∑f∈F r(f) = θ(F). In this context, the imputation
set I(F , θ) of the game is the set of the payoff allocations that are efficient
and individually rational, while the core C(F , θ) ⊆ I(F , θ) of the game is the
set of the payoff allocations that are efficient and coalition rational, that is∑
f∈D r(f) ≥ θ(D), for all D ⊆ F . Hence when the core is not empty there is
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at least a payoff allocation which belongs to it, meaning that no sub-coalition
D ⊆ F has an incentive to break the grand coalition F and share the payoff
it is able to obtain independently, because this can only decrease.
Curiel and Tijs (1986) state that the core of the permutation game is
not empty and that there is a bijective relation between the elements of the
core and the optimal solutions of the problem (4). In particular, the profits
r(f) as defined in Property 1 define a core payoff allocation. Given the core
characteristics, the next property follows.
Property 3. The exchange mechanism that assigns to every f ∈ F the
TW k∗f ∈ Ls optimal for problem (3), charges the dual price p∗(k∗f ) for it
and refund the dual price p∗(af ) for the FPFS released TW, is coalition
rational and defines Pareto optimal profits whose overall value is equal to∑
f∈F r(f) =
∑
f∈F [C(f, af )− C(f, k∗)].
It is important to note that the linear problem (3) always produce an
optimal solution which corresponds to a feasible exchange, i.e. an integer
solution that maximizes the value over all possible exchanges. This is guar-
anteed by the existence of at least one feasible solution represented by the
FPFS allocation and the particular description of the single capacity con-
straint problem as a bipartite weighted matching. Hence also its dual has at
least one solution providing prices p∗ which are market clearing, i.e. accord-
ing to which each flight executes the profit maximizing exchange. However
due to the multiple degeneracy of the primal problem (3) there would typ-
ically be multiple solutions to the dual, each one representing a different
market clearing vector of TW prices p∗ which implies a different vector of
flight payoffs r, whose global value is nevertheless constant due to property
3. In these cases a particular pair of primal dual solutions could be selected
to force further properties such as pairwise-monotonicity (Miquel, 2009) to
try to have all flights obtaining non-null profits.
There are some situations where a flight may find convenient to misrep-
resent its true cost of delay to increase its payoff, at the expense of other
flights, as shown in Appendix B. This is not surprising due to the impossibil-
ity theorem of Myerson and Satterwhite (1983), since we require individual
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rationality and budget balance constraints to hold. However the number of
situations in which this fact can be exploited seems to be limited and it would
be necessary to have a perfect knowledge of other players’ values in order to
be sure that the payoff from the exchange does not decrease.
3.6 The General Case: Multiple Capacity Con-
strained Resources
We now turn to the general case in which there are multiple capacity
constrained resources (i.e. sectors and airports), S = {1, ..., S} with |S| > 1
and each flight f ∈ F can plan to use a combination of resources Sf ⊆ S
according to its flight plan. Hence f needs to be assigned one TW sf ∈ Ls
for each s ∈ Sf . This implies that although all single TWs individually
represent a valuable resource, a TW bundle B = {TW 1f , ..., TW |Sf |f} has
a non-additive value over the single items TW if composing it, since only
complete packages are valuable. This value v(f,B) = −C(f,B) can be
expressed as the opposite of the cost of delay it induces on flight f . We can
identify two important kinds of non-additivity:
• Substitutability: a valuation function v exhibits substitutability if there
exist two sets of goods B1, B2, such that B1∩B2 = ∅ and v(B1∪B2) <
v(B1) + v(B2). When this condition holds, we say that the valuation
function v is sub-additive. When two items are strict substitutes their
combined value is the same as the value for either one of the goods.
• Complementarity: a valuation function v exhibits complementarity
if there exist two sets of goods B1, B2, such that B1 ∩ B2 = ∅ and
v(B1 ∪ B2) > v(B1) + v(B2). When this condition holds, we say that
the valuation function v is super-additive. When two distinct items
complement each other their combined value is higher than the sum of
their individual values.
Let us assume again, as it was for the previous case of single capacity
constrained resource, that valuation functions are quasi-linear in the money,
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i.e. the total cost for f of a bundle q ∈ Qf with price p(q) ≥ 0 is TC(f, q) =
C(f, q) + p(q). Moreover we assume that there are no externalities, since
each participant’s valuation depends only on the subset of items assigned
and does not depend on the allocations and payments of the other agents.
When these types of valuation functions are in place in an auction, the
bidders face the exposure problem: a bidder might aggressively bid for a
set of goods with the purpose of winning the entire bundle, but succeed in
winning only a subset of the goods, thus paying too much. In particular
this problem is likely to arise in situations where bidders’ valuations exhibit
complementarities, because in these cases bidders might be willing to pay
substantially more for bundles of goods than they would pay if the goods
were sold separately.
To overcome this problem combinatorial auctions allow bidders to bid di-
rectly on bundles of goods and auctioneer to sell all goods in a single auction.
This eliminates the exposure problem because bidders are guaranteed that
their bids are satisfied all-or-nothing.
We suppose again that a FPFS assignment A = {a1, ..., aF}, where af =
{TW 1f , ..., TW |Sf |f } is a bundle of TW, constitutes an initial endowment for
each flight. According to the notation defined in section 3.4, we can formulate
the optimal TW exchange problem for the general case as the following binary
IP program:
ZIP−E = max
∑
f∈F
∑
q∈Qf
V (f, q)x(f, q) (5a)
subject to ∑
f∈F
∑
q∈Qf :q3k
x(f, q) ≤ 1 ∀s ∈ S, k ∈ Ls (5b)∑
q∈Qf
x(f, q) = 1 ∀f ∈ F (5c)
x(f, q) ∈ {0, 1} ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Qf (5d)
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Where V (f, q) = [C(f, af )− C(f, q)] is the value obtained by flight f by
exchanging bundle af with bundle q and will be positive if the delay caused
by bundle q is lower than delay caused by af , negative otherwise. Constraints
(5b) impose that for all resources s ∈ S, each TW k ∈ Ls is assigned at most
to one flight, while each flight must receive exactly one bundle of TW q in its
set of feasible requests Qf according to constraints (5c). Thus the objective
is to find the exchange of TWs among flights that maximizes the value over
all feasible exchanges.
A feasible solution will exist if and only if there are enough TWs and
requests, such that the assigned bundles are pairwise disjoint, i.e. they do
not share any TW. In order to guarantee the existence of a feasible solution
we assume that each regulated resource s ∈ S has an infinite capacity after
the termination of its regulation (as assumed in Terrab and Odoni, 1993)
and that each flight has a request qw ∈ Qf that includes only TWs after
the termination of each regulation traversed. The cost C(f, qw) associated to
this bundle will be equal to either the cost of delay caused by such a bundle
or to the cost of cancellation in the case this delay exceeds MaxDelf .
Property 4. The problem of determining the maximum value TW exchange
is NP-hard.
Proof. By reduction of problem (5) to the following equivalent Weighted Set
Packing Problem as defined in Rothkopf et al. (1998):
ZSPP = max
∑
f∈F
∑
q∈Q′f
V (f, q)x(f, q) (6a)
subject to ∑
f∈F
∑
q∈Q′f :q3k
x(f, q) ≤ 1 ∀s ∈ S ′, k ∈ Ls (6b)
x(f, q) ∈ {0, 1} ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Q′f (6c)
where the request sets Q′f are obtained by appending one dummy item TW
f
d
on an dummy resource d to each bundle q, such that each flight f ∈ F has
one different dummy TW associated and this same TW is appended to all
its requests q ∈ Q′f . Then the new set of resources is S ′ = S ∪ d and this
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prevents multiple assignments to the same flight, due to the set of constraints
(6b). The introduction of dummy items in order to transform requests into
mutually exclusive is commonly referred to as the OR∗ language and is due
to Fujishima et al. (1999).
Let us define ZLP−E as the objective value of the linear relaxation of
problem (5), whose dual problem is
ZDLP−E = min
∑
f∈F
u(f) +
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈Ls
p(k) (7a)
subject to
u(f) +
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈(Ls∩q)
p(k) ≥ V (f, q) ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Qf (7b)
p(k) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S ′, sl ∈ Ls (7c)
Let us assume for the moment a linear structure of prices, i.e. for of each
bundle of slots q ∈ Qf its price will be p(q) =
∑
k∈q p(k).
The complementary slackness conditions for the linear programming re-
laxation of problem (5) and its dual (7) are:
x∗(f, q) > 0⇒ u∗(f) +
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈(Ls∩q)
p∗(k) = V (f, q) ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Qf (8a)
u∗(f) +
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈(Ls∩q)
p(k) > V (f, q)⇒ x∗(f, q) = 0 ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Qf (8b)
∑
f∈F
∑
q∈Qf :q3k
x(f, q) < 1 ⇒ p(k) = 0 ∀s ∈ S, k ∈ Ls (9a)
p(k) > 0⇒
∑
f∈F
∑
q∈Qf :q3k
x(f, q) = 1 ∀s ∈ S, k ∈ Ls (9b)
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3.6.1 Walrasian Equilibrium with Linear Prices
Let us define the demand of a flight f as a bundle q∗f that minimizes
its total cost (i.e. delay + payment) over all q ∈ Qf given its cost function
C(f, ·) and individual TW prices p. Thus it will be:
C(f, q∗f ) +
∑
k∈q∗f
p(k) < C(f, q) +
∑
k∈q
p(k) ∀f ∈ F , q 6= q∗f ∈ Qf
There may be more than one such a bundle, in which case each of them
is called a demand. Because of complementary slackness condition (8a),
for every flight with x∗(f, q∗f ) > 0, constraint (7b) is binding while for all
other bundles q 6= q∗f ∈ Qf a strict inequality holds. Hence the optimal
solution to problem (5), whenever it coincides with the solution to its linear
programming relaxation, constitutes a demand for each flight.
A vector of nonnegative prices p∗ and a TW allocation T ∗ = {q∗1, ..., q∗f}
form a Walrasian equilibrium if for every flight f ∈ F , q∗f is a demand of
flight f at prices p∗ and for any TW j that is not allocated (i.e. j /∈ ⋃f∈F q∗f )
we have p∗(j) = 0. The set of prices p∗ =
⋃
s∈S,k∈Ls p
∗(k) is the set of market
clearing prices.
Then it follows the Theorem 2:
Theorem 2. If an integral optimal solution exists for the linear programming
relaxation of problem (5), then a Walrasian equilibrium also exists formed by
the optimal primal solution T ∗ and by the optimal dual solution p∗ (Bikhchan-
dani and Mamer, 1997).
Proof. If T ∗ = {q∗1, ..., q∗F} is a feasible allocation (i.e. an integer solution)
obtained by solving the linear programming relaxation of problem (5) and
p∗ and u∗ are optimal solutions to the its dual problem (7), then because
of complementary slackness condition (8a), q∗f is a demand for each flight f ,
while for condition (9a) any TW j that is not allocated has a price equal to
zero, i.e. for all k ∈ q and q ∈ Qf such that x(f, q) < 1 then p∗(j) = 0.
Hence this implies an even stronger condition that individual rationality:
not only every flight diminishes its total cost by implementing the exchange,
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but also no flight may prefer another exchange different from T ∗ because this
is the exchange with maximal value, given prices p∗. Then the exchange is
Pareto efficient.
The resulting mechanism that assigns to each flight a bundle q∗f , optimal
for problem (5) as well as for for its linear programming relaxation, charges
the dual prices
∑
k∈q∗f p
∗(k) and refund the dual prices
∑
k∈af p
∗(k) for the
FPFS released bundle is weakly budget balanced, hence it can produce a
monetary surplus for the auctioneer.
In fact all TWs unassigned under FPFS which are assigned in the optimal
allocation have a price p∗(k) > 0 according to (9b). This price has to be
payed by the receiving flight but is not due to anyone since that slot was
unallocated under FPFS. On the contrary, according to (9a) any TW i that
is not assigned in the optimal allocation has a price p∗(i) = 0, meaning that
the flight giving up a slot received under FPFS which is not allocated by
the market mechanism does not receive any compensation for it. This is in
contrast with the case of a single capacity-constrained resource, where all the
TWs unassigned by FPFS (and only them) remain unassigned in the market
allocation, and the mechanism is strongly budget balanced (cf. Property 2).
Consider in fact the case of 2 capacity constrained resources (A,B) and 3
flights: f1 crossing only resource A in E
A
1 , f2 crossing A and B respectively in
EA2 > E
A
1 and E
B
2 and f3 crossing only resource B in E
B
3 > E
B
2 . Suppose that
EA1 and E
A
2 correspond to the same TW
A
1 , E
B
2 correspond to TW
B
1 , while
EB3 correspond to another TW
B
2 successive to TW
B
1 . The FPFS principle
then will assign a delay to f2 which will move to TW
A
2 and TW
B
2 due to the
precedence of f1 in A and as a consequence f3 will be assigned TW
B
3 . Hence
TWB1 remains unassigned under FPFS but it can be assigned by the market
mechanism if prices p∗ are such that:
C(f1, TW
A
2 ) + p
∗(TWA2 ) < C(f1, TW
A
1 ) + p
∗(TWA1 )
C(f2, (TW
A
1 ;TW
B
1 )) + p
∗(TWA1 ) + p
∗(TWB1 ) <
C(f2, (TW
A
2 ;TW
B
2 )) + p
∗(TWA2 ) + p
∗(TWB2 )
C(f3, TW
B
2 ) + p
∗(TWB2 ) < C(f3, TW
B
3 ) + p
∗(TWB3 )
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Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) prove that a Walrasian equilibrium for
the general TW exchange problem exists if and only if the integrality gap
between problem (5) and its LP relaxation is null.
3.6.1.1 Structures for the Existence of Walrasian Equilibria
Under certain special restrictions on the agents’ valuation functions, on
the structure of requests or on the structure of prices however the existence
of an equilibrium can be guaranteed. This is the case for example of the
single capacity-constrained resource exchange as we proved in section 3.5,
where valuations do not exhibit complementarity since each agent is inter-
ested only in one TW. Such unitary demand restriction turns the valuation
functions to belong to a broader class referred to as gross-substitute valu-
ations (Kelso and Crawford, 1982; Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). Under the
gross-substitute assumption it is verified that for every pair of price vectors
p′ ≥ p (component-wise comparison), the optimal TW package demanded by
a flight f at prices p′ contains all the items in the optimal package demanded
by f at prices p, whose price remained constant. Whenever there are com-
plementarities in valuations functions as in the case of multiple constrained
resources, gross-substitutes property does not hold anymore.
Yet another restriction that guarantees the existence of a Walrasian equi-
librium is on the structure of the requests. Consider a tree T , i.e. a connected
graph without cycles, with a distance function d associated and for each ver-
tex v ∈ T let N(v, r) denote the set of all vertices in T that are within
distance r from v. Consider that vertices in T represent individual TWs
connected by a path with no cycles. Then if all the requests are constrained
to be of the type N(v, r), the constraint matrix associated with the LP re-
laxation of problem (5) is balanced, i.e. it contains only 0-1 elements and
has no square submatrix of odd order with exactly two 1’s in each row and
column (Schrijver, 1986). In this case the integrality gap between problem
(5) and its LP relaxation is null.
Rothkopf et al., 1998 and de Vries and Vohra, 2003 identify other sufficient
conditions that guarantee the integrality of the solutions to linear programs,
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most of which correspond with the Set Packing formulation of problem (6),
also referred to as the OR version of the problem. However the unique
assignment constraints (5c) in our formulation, which is usually referred to as
the Exclusive OR (XOR) version, destroy most of the properties of the matrix
associated to the correspondent OR formulation that guarantee integrality.
3.6.2 Non-linear Prices
Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) extend the concept of Walrasian equilib-
rium to a general concept of competitive equilibrium, by assuming non-linear
prices for packages of TWs. They re-formulate the maximum value assign-
ment through the following linear program:
max
∑
f∈F
∑
q∈Qf
V (f, q)x(f, q) (10a)
subject to ∑
q∈Qf
x(f, q) = 1 ∀f ∈ F (10b)
∑
f∈F ,q∈Qf :q≡b
x(f, q) ≤
∑
m3b
y(m) ∀b ∈ B (10c)
∑
m∈M
y(k) ≤ 1 (10d)
x(f, q), y(m) ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Qf ,m ∈M (10e)
Where the notation is the same as in model (5), with the addition of
the set B, composed by all the feasible TW bundles which belong to the set
of requests for at least one flight, i.e. B = {∪b : b ∈ Qf ,∀f ∈ F}. This
formulation extends the LP relaxation of problem (5) by adding M , which
denotes the set of feasible partitions of TW into packages.
For example if we have 2 sectors (P,Z) with their allocation lists SP =
{1..7} and SZ = {1..7} and 2 flights (f1, f2) which cross both P and Z, then
each flight will need a package composed by two TWs, one for each crossed
sector. In this case we indicate [(1, 4), (2, 5)] as a feasible partition of TWs
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into packages which assigns TW 1 in sector P and TW 4 in sector Z to one
flight and TW 2 in sector P and TW 5 in sector Z to the other flight.
The TWs not assigned can be considered to form a dummy package which
completes the partition, while variable y(m) = 1 indicates that allocations
of TWs to flights must be restricted to the bundles in partition m ∈M . For
example if partition [(1, 4), (2, 5)] is selected, then the only valid allocations
are those that assign (1, 4) to some flight and (2, 5) to the other one. Con-
straints (10c) and (10d) replace constraint (1b) and impose that each TW is
not allocated more than once. The dual is:
min
∑
f∈F
u(f) + pi (11a)
subject to
u(f) + p(q) ≥ V (f, q) ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Qf (11b)
pi −
∑
b∈m
p(b) ≥ 0 ∀m ∈M (11c)
p(b), pi ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F , b ∈ B (11d)
Constraints (11b) and (11c) correspond to primal variables x(f, q) and
y(m) respectively, while variables ui, p(b) and pi correspond to constraints
(10b), (10c) and (10d) respectively.
Variables p(b) ∀b ∈ B, can be interpreted as bundle prices, which are
now nonlinear since p(b) 6= p(b1)+p(b2), for some b = b1
⋃
b2 and b1
⋂
b2 = ∅.
Variable u(f) = maxq∈Qf{V (f, q)− p(q)} can be interpreted as the maximal
utility to flight f at prices p(q) and pi = maxm∈M
∑
b∈k p(b) as the maximal
price volume which can be generated by the exchange.
Constraint (11b) is equivalent to the original constraint (7b) which im-
posed individual rationality, then it continues to hold that the exchange
between the FPFS assigned bundles and the bundles optimal for model (10)
at prices p∗(b) is individual rational.
Prices however are no more linear, so Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002)
extend the definition of Walrasian equilibrium (i.e., a pricing equilibrium with
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linear, anonymous prices) to the general one of competitive equilibrium,
which is defined as an allocation T ∗ and a set of prices p∗, according to
which each flight receives the utility maximizing bundle at prices p∗ and the
allocation T ∗ is the one with maximal prices among all feasible partitions.
Optimal dual prices support a competitive equilibrium whenever the solution
to the primal is integral. However it is not guaranteed that problem (10)
always gives integer solutions.
Let’s assume for example that there are 3 flights (f1, f2, f3), each one
crossing 2 consecutive sectors in the same order, and their requests (and
costs associated) are the following:
Qf1 = {(1, 4), (0); (1, 5), (57); (2, 5), (76); (2, 6), (171); (3, 6), (190)]}
Qf2 = {(1, 3), (0); (1, 4), (24); (2, 4), (36); (2, 5), (96); (3, 5), (108)]}
Qf3 = {(1, 4), (0); (2, 4), (7); (2, 6), (42); (3, 6), (49); (3, 7), (84)]}
The set M will be composed by 10 different feasible partitions:
M = {[(1, 4), (2, 5), (3, 6)]; [(1, 4), (2, 5), (3, 7)]; [(1, 4), (3, 5), (2, 6)];
[(1, 5), (2, 4), (3, 6)]; [(1, 5), (2, 4), (3, 7)]; [(2, 5), (1, 3), (3, 6)];
[(2, 5), (1, 3), (3, 7)]; [(2, 6), (1, 3), (3, 7)]; [(2, 6), (1, 4), (3, 7)];
[(3, 6), (1, 3), (2, 4)]}
Suppose that FPFS assigns bundle (1, 5) to f1, (2, 4) to f2 and (3, 6) to
f3. In this case the optimal solution to problem (10) is fractional (x(1, 1) =
x(1, 3) = x(2, 1) = x(2, 3) = y(1) = y(10) = 1
2
, x(3, 4) = 1) and the ob-
jective value is Z∗LP = 37. The optimal feasible integer allocation (x(1, 3) =
x(2, 1) = x(3, 4) = y(6) = 1), obtained by substituiting x(f, q), y(m) ∈ {0, 1}
in constraint (10e) implies an optimal exchange with value Z∗IP = 17. In this
case there are not dual variables corresponding to supporting prices, since
there is a gap between the integer program and its linear relaxation.
Parkes (2001) proves that the following conditions are sufficient for the
solution of problem (10) to be integral:
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• The safe bids condition: each pair of bundles in the set of requests is
non-disjoint, i.e., they share at least one item: ∀q1, q2 ∈ Qf q1∩q2 6= ∅;
• The supermodular valuations condition: ∀q1, q2 ⊆M V (f, q1)+V (f, q2) ≤
V (f, q1 ∪ q2) + V (f, q1 ∩ q2).
The latter condition implies that all TW bundles are complements for
flights, which is not the case since each flight just requires 1 TW on each
resource and the cost of delay represented by two non intersecting bundles is
just the min cost of delay between them.
The safe bids condition is neither automatically verified since non inter-
secting bundles can belong to the request set of a flight. It could be artifi-
cially imposed by adding one flight-specific dummy TW to each bundle in
the flight’s request set. However this pre-processing transforms the problem
in another specific version of the third-order formulation (12) proposed by
Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002):
max
∑
f∈F
∑
q∈Qf
V (f, q)x(f, q) (12a)
subject to ∑
q∈Qf
x(f, q) = 1 ∀f ∈ F (12b)
x(f, q) ≤
∑
m3[f,q]
y(m) ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Qf (12c)∑
m∈M ′
y(m) ≤ 1 (12d)
x(f, q), y(m) ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Qf ,m ∈M ′ (12e)
This formulation extends the linear programming relaxation of model (10)
by modifying M into M ′, which is the set of all feasible partitions of TW
into packages to be specifically assigned to different flights, where [f, q] ∈ m
indicates that a flight-partition m ∈ M ′ contains bundle q designated for
the specific flight f . Variable y(m) corresponds to the selection of a flight-
partition m ∈M ′.
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For example with 2 flights (f1, f2) and 2 TWs (1, 2) belonging to both
request sets Qf1 and Qf2 , the set of agent-partitions is:
M ′ = {[(f1, 1), (f2, 2)], [(f1, 2), (f2, 1)]}
then if partition [(f1, 1), (f2, 2)] is selected the only valid allocations are those
that assign TW 1 to f1 and TW 2 to f2.
The difference with model (10) is in constraint (10c), which becomes
(12c), all other constraints remaining the same. For the 3 flights example
reported before, the set M ′ of agent-partitions enlarges to 84 elements, since
in this formulation the model distinguishes for example between allocation
[(1, 4), (2, 5), (3, 6)] and another feasible allocation [(1, 4), (3, 6), (2, 5)].
The dual is:
min
∑
f∈F
u(f) + pi (13a)
subject to
u(f) + p(f, q) ≥ V (f, q) ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Qf (13b)
pi −
∑
[f,q]∈m
p(f, q) ≥ 0 ∀m ∈M (13c)
u(f), p(f, q), pi ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Qf (13d)
The third-order equilibrium obtained by solving problem (12) on our for-
mer example implies the allocation (x(1, 3) = x(2, 1) = x(3, 4) = y(6) = 1)
which is integral and supported by non-anonymous bundle prices p(f, q),
which are dual variables corresponding to primal constraints (12d). For
example at equilibrium, the same bundle of slot (1, 4) is priced differently
depending on the requesting flight: p(1, (1, 4)) = 118, p(2, (1, 4)) = 83,
p(3, 1, 4) = 49, even if it is not part of the optimal allocation.
Although it is always possible to add inequalities to a linear program to
make the optimal solution integral (see e.g. Schrijver, 1986), the formulation
by Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) is very powerful because it has a natural
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economical interpretation of dual variables as non-linear and non-anonymous
auction prices.
Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3. The optimal solution to linear problem (12) is always integral
and therefore a competitive equilibrium with non-linear and non-anonymous
prices always exist.
Therefore by employing prices on packages rather than on individual TWs
and by discriminating among different flights, one can ensure the existence
of a competitive equilibrium, which constitutes an extension of the classical
Walrasian equilibrium with linear prices. However this guarantee comes at
the expenses of the computational complexity, due to the exponential increase
of the solution space in the number of feasible allocations and flights, since
in practice problem (12) stores one y variable for every possible solution.
Additionally the bundle prices (both the anonymous obtained by model
(11) when they exist and non-anonymous obtained by model (13)) do not
guarantee the exchange to be budget balanced, since the sum of the prices
of FPFS packages can be larger than the total price of market packages.
This implies that the central authority should pay more to the flights as
compensation for the packages they release than it receives from them for
the optimal packages.
3.6.3 The AkBA Model
Wurman and Wellman (2000) formulate the ‘Ascending k-Bundle Auction
mechanism’ (AkBA), which can always determine equilibrium prices support-
ing the combinatorial exchange problem (5), under certain assumptions. In
particular this mechanism requires prices to be non-linear, the valuation func-
tions of the agents to be monotone (i.e. V (f, q1) ≤ V (f, q2) for all q1 ⊆ q2),
and each participant to require at most one bundle. This last condition can
be modified into an equality constraint for our problem (constraint (5c)) all
the rest remaining unchanged.
After solving problem (5) to determine the optimal allocation T ∗ =
{q∗1, ..., q∗F} and the correspondent welfare function value ZIP−E, the mech-
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anism employs a dual program due to Leonard (1983), to compute minimal
prices for assignment problems. We can adapt this model in order to fit with
our problem, in the following way:
min
∑
q∈T ∗
p(q) (14a)
subject to
u(f) + p(q) ≥ V (f, q) ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ T ∗ (14b)
p(g) ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ T ∗ (14c)∑
f∈F
u(f) +
∑
q∈T ∗
p(q) = ZIP−E (14d)
where T ∗ is the set composed by all bundles allocated by the primal problem
(5)1 and ZIP−E is the welfare attained by the optimal exchange. The combi-
natorial exchange problem (5) restricted to bundles q ∈ T ∗ is defined as the
assignment subproblem because it omits from the formulation all the bundles
unassigned in the optimal allocation. The price vector p∗ obtained by solving
problem (14) is a price equilibrium for the assignment subproblem, because
constraints (14b) impose that for each flight f no other bundle than the one
received can increase its utility. In particular this solution is the minimum
price equilibrium. In their original formulation Wurman and Wellman (2000)
formulate a model to obtain maximum price equilibria by simply changing
the objective function (14a) into min
∑
f∈F u(f), all other constraints re-
maining the same. In our setting however this problem is unbounded since
u(f) R 0.
Once all the bundles q∗f ∈ T ∗ = {q∗1, ..., q∗F} have been priced and the
correspondent utilities u∗(f) determined, the price on unassigned bundles
b ∈ B0 is calculated according to the following:
1In their formulation Wurman and Wellman (2000) include in T ∗ one dummy item φi
for each unallocated agent i and they impose a value V (i, φi) = 0 for it. This is required
by the inequality constraint they have in the primal problem instead of constraint (5c) as
in our case
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p(b) = max
f∈F
[V (f, b)− u∗(f)] ∀b ∈ B0
An exchange mechanism that adopts those non-linear prices is therefore
individually rational due to constraints (14b), but not budget balanced, since
prices p(b) on bundles that were allocated by FPFS which remain non allo-
cated in the optimal allocation T ∗, have to be payed by the auctioneer in
order to compensate flights releasing them.
3.6.4 Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) prices
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) class of auction (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke,
1971; Groves, 1973) is central in auction theory and mechanism design. VCG
auction is a sealed-bid, one-shot type of combinatorial auction which is in-
centive compatible and produces an allocation that is economically efficient.
It provides a dominant-strategy solution to the combinatorial exchange prob-
lem, which is centrally solved by the auctioneer who calculates optimal allo-
cation and prices based on the information announced by participants. The
particular form of payments make truth-revelation the dominant strategy for
each of them, independently from what is the information communicated by
others.
The efficient exchange T ∗ with optimal value value ZIP−E(F) is first cal-
culated centrally according to the problem (5) including all f ∈ F . Problem
(5) is successively re-computed with each flight g ∈ F , together with its
FPFS allocated bundle af , taken out of the exchange in turn:
ZIP−E(F\g) = max
∑
f∈(F\g)
∑
(q∈Qf :q∩af=∅)
V (f, q)x(f, q) (15)
subject to constraints (5b), (5c),(5d)
Then each flight g payment is calculated as follows:
pvcg(g) = V (g, q
∗
f )− [ZIP−E(F)− ZIP−E(F\g)]
Each flight thus pays a price equal to its value for the exchange, dis-
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counted by the incremental benefit arising from its inclusion into the mech-
anism. This last term is called the marginal product of flight g. It can
be proven that it is always non-negative since the correspondent coalitional
game is superadditive, i.e. the characteristic welfare function is superaddi-
tive in the number of participants. This is equivalent to prove that, since
the exclusion of a flight from the mechanism also implies the exclusion of its
FPFS assigned slots, then the maximum value attainable by the exchange
without one flight g will be lower than the maximum value including this
flight, since the opportunities for exchanges will increase for both the group
F\g and the flight g, i.e. ZIP−E(F)− ZIP−E(F\g) ≥ 0.
A negative payment means that the flight receives a compensation, while
a positive payment means that it must pay the exchange. In both cases the
term [ZIP−E(F)−ZIP−E(F\g)] represents a ‘bonus’, since negative payments
are larger (in absolute value) and positive payments are smaller.
The profit deriving from the allocation q∗g to flight g ∈ F is:
rvcg(g) = V (f, q
∗
g)− pV CG(g) = ZIP−E(F)− ZIP−E(F\g)
The VCG exchange is thus individual rational since each flight f will
derive a profit from the exchange which is always non negative.
The VCG exchange mechanism is strategyproof since a flight g has
no interest in misrepresenting its true value for an exchange. In fact if it
declares Vˆ (g, ·) 6= V (g, ·) then the central authority chooses the allocation qˆ∗
based on this information, i.e. by maximizing
∑
f∈F\g
∑
q∈Qf V (f, q)x(f, q)+∑
i∈Qg Vˆ (g, i)x(g, i) and its profit becomes:
rˆvcg(g) = V (g, q
∗
g)− Vˆ (g, q∗g) + ZIP−E(F)− ZIP−E(F\g)
= V (g, q∗g) +
∑
f 6=g
V (f, q∗f )− ZIP−E(F\g)
The only term which depends on g is the true valuation V (g, q∗g), thus
utility of the exchange does not depend directly on the declared value Vˆ (g, ·).
The optimal trade instead is calculated upon the declared values in order to
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maximize the global welfare, thus a flight should announce Vˆ (g, ·) = V (g, ·)
in order to align the optimal solution to the exchange with its own interests.
The implementation of the VCG exchange requires agents to submit the
complete set of their valuation functions and successively the resolution of
F + 1 optimization problems.
Unfortunately when this VCG pricing rule is adopted in our TW exchange
model, the resulting mechanism is individual rational, strategy-proof and al-
locative efficient but not budget balanced and this comes at no surprise given
the impossibility result in Myerson and Satterwhite (1983), which proves that
no economical efficient exchange mechanism can guarantee at the same time
Individual Rationality, Budget Balance and Incentive Compatibility.
In order for the mechanism to be budget-balanced it should verify that∑
i∈F pV CG(f) ≥ 0, i.e. the total amount paid by flights must be greater than
or equal to the total amount they receive as compensation from the exchange.
This is not verified in our setting, in fact if we consider the previous example
with 3 flights, we have ZIP−E(F) = 17, ZIP−E(F\i) = 0 ∀i = 1, ..., 3 since
no exchange takes place without one flight participating and pvcg(1) = −36,
pvcg(2) = 19, pvcg(3) = −17, hence the central authority must pay 34 at the
end of the exchange. Even if we impose pvcg(3) = 0 since flight 3 maintains
its FPFS assigned bundle, the central authority must pay 17.
3.6.5 VCG-based Prices
To overcome this issue and guarantee the budget balance property, Parkes
et al. (2001) propose a payment rule for an exchange that is individual ratio-
nal and budget balanced and that minimize the distance to VCG payments,
thus being quasi strategyproof.
They formalize the problem as the following linear program:
min
∆
L(∆,∆V CG) (16a)
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subject to ∑
f∈F
∆(f) ≤ ZIP−E(F) (16b)
∆(f) ≤ ∆V CG(f) ∀f ∈ F (16c)
∆(f) ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F (16d)
where ∆V CG = (∆V CG(1), ...,∆V CG(F )) is the vector of flights’ marginal
products as calculated under the classic VCG mechanism (i.e. ∆V CG(g) =
ZIP−E(F)− ZIP−E(F\g)), which are also referred to as VCG discounts.
The objective of problem (16) is to find discounts ∆ = (∆(1), ...,∆(F ))
which minimize the distance to VCG discounts according to a suitable dis-
tance function L(∆,∆V CG). Constraints (16c) ensure that for each flight
f ∈ F its VCG discount is an upper bound on the implemented discount,
while constraint (16b) ensures budget balance and constraints (16d) ensure
individual rationality.
The payment rule is thus formulated to minimize the distance to VCG
payments, under different metrics. The simplest distance metric considered
by Parkes et al. (2001) is L2(∆,∆V CG) = sumf∈F(∆V CG(f)−∆(f))2. Then
rather than solving problem (16a) directly, they compute an analytic expres-
sion for the family of solutions that corresponds to each distance function.
Each family of solution constitutes a parametrized payment rule.
For example the Threshold payment rule corresponds to the distance
metric L2. According to this rule ∆
∗(f, Ct) = max(0,∆V CG(f)−Ct) depends
on the selection of the parameter Ct, which is selected at its optimal value if it
is the smallest Ct for which the objective function (16b) holds. The payment
rule is then implemented by assigning the discount ∆∗(f, C∗t ) = ∆V CG(f)−C∗t
to all flights f with ∆V CG(f) > C
∗
t , while all other flights receive a discount
∆∗(f, C∗t ) = 0.
Experimental and theoretical analysis performed by Parkes et al. (2001)
on several distance functions L, suggests that this Threshold rule has useful
incentive properties and provides allocative efficiency higher than other rules,
by removing easy opportunities for manipulation. In particular this rule
minimizes the maximal amount that the agent can increase its utility with
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some bid by misrepresenting its valuation, all other agents’ valuations held
constant.
Although residual potential benefits for non-truthful bidding remain, as
in all mechanisms which are Individual Rational and Budget Balanced, the
strategic behavior for agents with incomplete information about the prefer-
ences and strategies of other agents is made difficult.
The computational burden of the central authority is however non neg-
ligible under both VCG and VCG-based mechanisms, since F + 1 NP-hard
problems must be solved in both cases.
Table 3.1 resumes the characteristics of an exchange mechanism according
to the different pricing rules and valuation functions of the bidders:
Prices
Condition for Outcome of the Exchange
existence Ind. Rat. B. Bal. Inc. Comp.
Linear
unit-demand Yes Yes No
gross-substitutes val Yes Yes No
Non-Linear
safe bids Yes No No
supermodular val Yes No No
Non-Linear
general val Yes No NoAND
Non-Anonymous
Non-Linear (AkBA) monotone val Yes No No
VCG general Yes No Yes
VCG-based general Yes Yes No
Table 3.1: Properties of different payment functions
For the Non-Linear pricing rule, another assumption that is always re-
quired is that each agent must value all bundles. Since the number of possible
bundles is exponential with the number of TW available, an automatic rule
is usually adopted to evaluate the price of a package not explicitly commu-
nicated by the participant. According to this rule, the same value of a given
package b0 is attached to all packages that contain this bundle. However the
number of variables still grows exponentially, even if the communication of
all the correspondent values is not necessary (Parkes et al., 2001).
Chapter 4
Iterative Market Mechanisms
The chapter presented models for determining the welfare maximizing
TW exchange that required the participants to directly send their valuation
to a central authority. To centrally solve the problem such models need in
principle to elicit from all flights f ∈ F their feasible requests q ∈ Qf , as
well as the non-linear cost of delay attached C(f, q). The optimal exchange
is then calculated centrally according to this information, thus implementing
a single-round, sealed-bid type of exchange (de Vries and Vohra, 2003). This
type of mechanism suffers from the following issues:
• The high computational effort for Airlines of calculating the complete
sets of requests and the value associated;
• The high computational cost for the central authority which must de-
termine the welfare maximizing exchange, which is (in the general case)
NP-hard (cf. 4).
• The high communication cost of sending the complete set of values over
a network;
• The complete disclosure for Airlines of confidential information, which
might be considered as private values in a highly competitive environ-
ment as commercial aviation.
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• The lack of dynamism, since all bids from participants must be com-
municated before a deadline.
In this section we consider iterative exchange models that allow agents
to indirectly send information about their valuations. Under these class of
exchange protocols, the mechanism repeatedly interacts with the different
agents, aiming to adaptively elicit enough information about their prefer-
ences as to be able to find a good (optimal or close to optimal) allocation.
The idea is that the adaptivity of the interaction with the bidders may al-
low pinpointing the information that is relevant to determine the exchange
without requiring full disclosure of agents valuations.
This may not only reduce the communication complexity of transferring
all the required information to the central authority, but also preserve some
privacy about agents’ valuations, only requiring the disclosure of information
that is really necessary to compute a solution. In addition in the real-life set-
ting, aircraft operators may need a non-negligible effort even for determining
their own valuation (e.g. data collection and manpower) and iterative mech-
anisms may assist them with estimating their valuations by focusing their
attention only to relevant data and possibly without requiring precise point
estimates but rather valid bounds.
Since the computational burden to determine the exchange is no more
entirely on the central authority but is shared by participants, iterative
mechanisms are sometimes qualified as distributed or de-centralized. This
emphasizes the fact that even if coordination and enforcement tasks are still
performed by a central authority, final outcomes are iteratively elaborated
through distributed computation of individual optimal solutions given public
prices.
Iterative auctions are modeled in general by considering the bidders as
“black-boxes”, represented by oracles, where the central auctioneer repeat-
edly queries these oracles. Several types of queries are possible; value queries
are those in which the central authority asks participants to report their val-
ues for particular exchanges. Demand queries imply that the central author-
ity communicates prices and the participants report the bundle demanded
at these prices. Order queries elicit the relative preference between pairs of
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solutions, while bound queries ask if a certain solution is worth at least a
given value. These and other types of queries are analyzed in Sandholm and
Boutilier (2005).
Parkes et al. (2008) provide a model for the general iterative combinato-
rial exchange problem that allows full expressiveness of the possible trades. It
employs linear price feedback and elicits information from bidders by query-
ing upper and lower values on exchanges. We rather exploit the particular
structure of our TW exchange problem, in which the central authority pos-
sesses some information regarding flights requests and delay cost structures.
This allows to simplify the elicitation by simply employing demand queries
which are easier to answer and more transparent from a user perspective.
4.1 An Iterative Algorithm for Gross-substitutes
Valuations
The most natural type of iterative mechanism for the determination of the
optimal exchange is the one in which individual TW prices increase gradually
until no TW that is provisionally assigned to one flight is demanded by
another. Intuitively, at this point demand equals supply and we are close to a
Walrasian equilibrium discussed in Section 3.6.1. This type of algorithm will
converge to a solution only in those settings in which a Walrasian equilibrium
is guaranteed to exist, namely when the gross-substitutability assumption
holds. This is the case of the unique capacity constrained resource, when all
TW packages requested by flights reduce to singletons.
The method of Bertsekas (1990) represents one of the earliest attempts to
solve the assignment problem in a distributed fashion and it can be adapted
to our problem as it follows.
The algorithm starts with the FPFS assignment af allocated to each flight
f ∈ F and prices p(k) = 0 for all k ∈ Ls where s is the capacity constrained
resource. Then iteratively the central authority proposes to all flights in
turn the current TW prices p(k); in response they announce the TW jf that
maximizes the profit of the exchange with its FPFS assigned TW af , i.e.
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jf = argmax
k∈Qf
{C(f, af )− C(f, k) + p(af )− p(k)},
and propose for this TW a higher bid price pˆ(jf ) = p(jf )+γi where γi ≥ 0
is the cost caused by executing the second best TW exchange after than jf ,
i.e., γi = maxk∈Qf :k 6=jf{C(f, af )−C(f, k)+p(af )−p(k)}−maxk∈Qf{C(f, af )−
C(f, k) + p(af )− p(k)}.
The price of each TW is set equal to the highest bid price and it is
allocated to the correspondent bidder. If another flight was already assigned
this TW earlier in the iteration, it becomes unassigned. This procedure
iteratively continues until all flights f ∈ F have a TW allocated. When this
condition holds, it has been proven by Bertsekas (1990) that this allocation
is also optimal for problem (3) and that the associated prices p∗(k) are equal
to the optimal solutions to problem (4) for all k ∈ Ls.
To avoid cycling caused by degeneracy, occurring when a flight f is indif-
ferent in exchanging or not its FPFS TW as the exchange gives no profit,
i.e., r(f) = 0, in these cases the algorithm sets the profit r(f) equal to −
with 0 <  < 1|BFjk|
, where |BFjk| is the number of TW between j and k
consecutively assigned under FPFS as defined in section 3.5.
This iterative mechanism implements a primal-dual algorithm: it starts
with a feasible solution to problem (4) in which p(k) = 0 for all k ∈ Ls, and
as long as the complementary-slackness conditions are unsatisfied proceeds
by improving the solution of the dual program (i.e., increasing some prices).
4.2 An iterative algorithm for the general prob-
lem
The model presented in previous section 4.1 constitutes an ascending
price auction algorithm adapted to our TW exchange problem. There is a
single monotonic price trajectory for each TW and the algorithm converges
to a Walrasian equilibrium in the cases in which participants present gross-
substitute valuation functions.
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We want to implement an iterative mechanism that converges under the
most general conditions, i.e. when valuation functions are non-linear and
exhibit complementarity over different TWs. For this purpose we analyze in
the following a distributed algorithm that exploits the decomposition prop-
erties of the original problem (5) into independent sub-problems which are
locally solvable by Aircraft Operators, without requiring other information
than the one relative to each individual flight. Under such mechanism the
central authority simply acts as a coordinator, by verifying the acceptabil-
ity of the flight requests and signaling back to them the unbalance between
demand and capacity, through appropriate prices.
In fact, by dualizing constraints (1b) the corresponding Lagrangian re-
laxation of problem (5) is:
ZLRLP−E(λ) = max
∑
f∈F
∑
q∈Qf
V (f, q)x(f, q)+
+
∑
s∈S,k∈Ls
λk(1−
∑
f∈F ,q∈Qf :q3k
x(f, q))
(17a)
subject to ∑
q∈Qf
x(f, q) = 1 ∀f ∈ F (17b)
x(f, q) ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Qf (17c)
We have thus removed the explicit capacity constraints (1b) from the
problem formulation and made them part of the objective function (17a)
with associated Lagrange multipliers λ. In this way the solution to problem
(17) needs not to be feasible for the original problem (5), however we obtain
a problem with an interesting structure. In fact problem (17) is separable
into F problems, one for each flight which can be solved locally by Aircraft
Operators, according to problem (18):
96 ITERATIVE MARKET MECHANISMS
ZLRLP−E(f, λ) = max
∑
q∈Qf
V (f, q)x(f, q)+
+
∑
s∈S,k∈Ls
λk(1−
∑
q∈Qf :q3k
x(f, q))
(18a)
subject to ∑
q∈Qf
x(f, q) = 1 (18b)
x(f, q) ≥ 0 ∀q ∈ Qf (18c)
Problem (18) is a linear problem and can be locally solved in polynomial
time by Aircraft Operators. For each TW k, its price λk is calculated centrally
according to the excess of demand for it and then communicated to Aircraft
Operators, which will in turn modify their demand according to such prices.
The following algorithm (19) can be employed to calculate prices:
λt+1k = max(0, λ
t
k − Φt · SGtk) (19a)
SGtk = 1−
∑
f∈F
∑
q∈Qf :q3k
x(f, q) (19b)
Where Φt is a positive stepsize chosen at iteration t and SGtk is a subgra-
dient of ZLRLP−E(λ) at any λ for which x solves problem (17). Thus ideally
the central authority seeks the prices λ that solve the following problem (20),
dual to problem (17):
ZLRDLP−E = min
λ
ZLRLP−E(λ) (20a)
subject to
λ ≥ 0 (20b)
Since ZLRLP−E(λ) is a convex, piecewise linear, non-differentiable func-
tion, this problem is typically solved through the subgradient algorithm
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(19). The resulting procedure iteratively alternates a central price-calculation
phase (problem 19) with a local optimization one which finds the maximal
value TW-exchange at current prices (problem (18) ∀f ∈ F). Held et al.
(1974) prove that by appropriately choosing the stepsize Φt such that Φt → 0
and
∑
t Φ
t → ∞ for t → ∞, the procedure converges to a solution which
minimizes ZLRLP−E(λ). By weak duality and linear programming theory
it will be verified in general that ZIP−E ≤ ZLP−E ≤ ZLRLP−E(λ), while it
will be ZIP−E = ZLP−E in the case of null gap between the integer program
and its linear relaxation and ZLP−E = ZLRLP−E = minλ ZLRLP−E(λ) when
the subgradient algorithm converges to an optimal solution for problem (20).
However this solution will be an optimal exchange for the original problem
(5) if and only if the gap between ZIP−E and its linear relaxation ZLP−E is
null, a condition which can only be guaranteed in the case of gross-substitute
valuations, such as when all participants compete for TW on a unique re-
source. In this case when ZLP−E = ZLRLP−E(λ∗), variables λ∗ correspond
to optimal equilibrium prices p∗, which can be obtained by centrally solving
problem (7).
Unfortunately even in the case of gross-substitutability there is no guar-
antee of convergence in a finite number of steps. By stopping the procedure
when a feasible exchange for the original problem (5) is demanded at current
prices λ, the optimality of the solution will be verified if and only if the com-
plementary slackness condition
∑
s∈S,k∈Ls λk(1 −
∑
f∈F ,q∈Qf :q3k x(f, q)) = 0
holds and ZLRLP−E(λ) = ZIP−E (see Proposition 3 in Larsson et al. (1999)
for a formal proof). This is only verified in the case that all unassigned TWs
k such that x(f, q) = 0 for all f ∈ F and q ∈ Qf such that k ∈ q, have a price
λk = 0. Hence when the procedure converges to a solution which is capacity
compliant, in general it will be ZLRLP−E(λ) ≥ ZIP−E, some lagrangian mul-
tipliers λk ≥ 0 will be higher than minimal prices and the solution will not
constitute a Walrasian equilibrium. However the correspondent exchange will
still be an equilibrium solution and will guarantee individual rationality and
weak budget balance. We propose in the following section an heuristic ap-
proach for determining an individual rational and budget balanced exchange
through a distributed iterative mechanism.
98 ITERATIVE MARKET MECHANISMS
4.3 An Heuristic Approach
In order to implement a distributed market mechanism that achieves, in
a reasonable amount of time, an exchange which is individual rational and
budget balanced we propose in this section a practical heuristic algorithm.
4.3.1 The Cost Structure
Given the trajectory of a flight which is published through the Flight Plan
and given the set of capacity-constrained resources S, it is possible for the
central authority to generate the ordered list of resources Sf crossed by flight
f , as well as the time relation between each pair of consecutive resources,
due to the estimated entry time Eif in each element i ∈ Sf .
The bundle Rf (1) = {TW f1 (1), ..., TW f|Sf |(1)} constitutes the most pre-
ferred bundle and represents the case in which no restrictions were applied
to the flight, i.e. d
Rf (1)
f = 0 and Rf (1) has a null cost of delay associated
C(f,Rf (1)) = 0.
From these values it is easy to build a set of acceptable bundles for each
flight f , i.e. the set of requests Qf = ∪MxRqfi=1 Rf (i), where Rf (MxRq) is the
least acceptable request for flight f , causing the maximum acceptable delay
MaxDelf .
We will say that for flight f a request A is preferred to request B and we
will indicate A  B if and only if dBf > dAf .
Since the most preferred bundle Rf (1) is the one original requested by
flight f and since we cannot anticipate but only delay flights, it will be
Rf (1)  B for all B ∈ Qf\Rf (1). Two different requests (A,B) ∈ Qf can
never be indifferent for f , otherwise they coincide. Further we can assume
that for each flight f the cost C(f, ·) is an increasing function of delay, thus
without loss of generality we can impose that C(f,B) > C(f, A) for all the
pairs (A,B) ∈ Qf such that A  B. It follows that the set of requests Qf is
a totally ordered set and this structure will be exploited in the heuristic for
minimizing the elicitation of information about different exchange values.
Hence we can denote a feasible assignment of bundles to flights as a
tuple (b1, ..., bF ) ∈ QF , such that no intersecting bundles are assigned (i.e.
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∩Ff=1bf = ∅) and where QF = Q1 × Q2 × ...QF is the Cartesian product of
the sets of flight requests. Since Qf can be put in bijective correspondence
with its rank set, each feasible assignment can be univocally defined through
the tuple of the corresponding ranks (r1, ..., rF ), where Rf (rf ) = bf for all
f ∈ F . Then the optimal exchange will be a rank set r∗ = (r∗1, ..., r∗F )
that maximizes the value of the exchange with a given FPFS assignment
(a1, ..., aF ), i.e. such that for all other feasible rank sets r = (r1, ..., rF ) it will
be
∑
f∈F V (f,Rf (rf )) ≤
∑
f∈F V (f,Rf (r
∗
f )).
This implies that the optimal rank set r∗ will be non dominated by any
other feasible one, i.e. there will be no other feasible rank set r such that
rf ≤ r∗f for all f ∈ F and rg < r∗g for at least one g ∈ F , otherwise∑
f∈F V (f,Rf (rf )) >
∑
f∈F V (f,Rf (r
∗
f )). This allows to restrict the solu-
tions space to the set of rank sets which are not dominated by any other one,
or equivalently to the set Pareto-efficient assignments P :
P = {(R1(r1), ..., RF (rF )) ∈ QF :
⋂
f∈F
Rf (rf ) = ∅ AND rf < r′f∀f ∈ F , r′i /∈ P}
The optimal solution will be the allocation with maximal global value
among all the Pareto-efficient solutions. Unfortunately the cardinality of P
grows superlinearly with MxRq, i.e. with the number of admissible requests
in each flight’s request set and can easily reach thousands of elements even
with a dozen flights and MxRq = 20 for each flight. Hence it results im-
practical to explicitely ask each participant the value of the exchanges in the
Pareto-set. The ordered structure of requests however can help in reducing
the number of demand queries performed in a sub-gradient procedure.
4.3.2 Modified Subgradient
Let us recall the Lagrangian problem (17) formulated in section 4.2 and
the subgradient algorithm (19) for solving it. A formula for Φt, the stepsize
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in the subgradient algorithm, which has been proven effective in practice is:
Φt =
µt(ZLRLP−E(λt)− Z∗IP−E)∑
s∈S,k∈Ls
(1−
∑
f∈F ,q∈Qf :q3k
xt(f, q))2
where 0 < µt ≤ 2, xt is the vector of solutions to problem (18) at iteration
t according to slot prices λt. Usually the scalar µt is taken at its higher
values during first iterations and halved whenever ZLRLP−E(λt) has failed
to decrease in a specified number of iterations (see Fisher, 1985). In our case
the central authority does not know the exchange values V (f, q) and thus
cannot calculate neither ZLRLP−E(λt) nor Z∗IP−E. We then modify formula
(4.3.2) in the following formula (21):
Φˆt =
µt(UB Z∗ − ZLBIP−E)∑
s∈S,k∈Ls
(1−
∑
f∈F ,q∈Qf :q3k
xt(f, q))2
(21)
where UB Z∗ is an upper bound on the optimal value of the exchange
which is held constant through iterations t. It can be established through
simulations and determined for standard cases depending on the cardinality
of F and of S. Instead ZLBIP−E is a lower bound on the optimal value of
the exchange for each instance, which is dynamically adjusted through the
course of the distributed mechanism. At iteration t the central authority can
in fact calculate for each bundle q demanded by flight f at current prices λt,
a lower bound on the exact value V (f, q) for the exchange:
LB(f, q) =
∑
s∈S,k∈Ls:q3k
λtk −
∑
s∈S,k∈Ls:af3k
λtk (22)
For all f ∈ F and q ∈ Qf , the lower bound can be initialized to LB(f, q) =
0 if dqf ≤ daff and to LB(f, q) = −∞ if dqf > daff , since we assume non-
negative costs of delay. This implies that each flight would exchange its
FPFS assigned bundle af with q for a cost greater or equal to zero whenever
q causes a shorter delay then af or for a negative cost (a taking) whenever q
represents a longer delay then af .
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At iteration t the central authority will calculate the LB(f, q) value ac-
cording to formula (22) and it will store it in memory if this value is higher
than the previously calculated one.
Also by exploiting the structure ofQf as a totally ordered set, it is possible
to update with this same value the LB(f, b) = LB(f, q) all the bundles
b ∈ Qf such that dbf < dqf , since the value of an exchange is a decreasing
function of delay and V (f, b) > V (f, j).
The central authority can then solve the following problem:
ZLBIP−E = max
∑
f∈F
∑
q∈Qf
LB(f, q)x(f, q) (23a)
subject to ∑
f∈F
∑
q∈Qf :q3k
x(f, q) ≤ 1 ∀s ∈ S, k ∈ Ls (23b)∑
q∈Qf
x(f, q) = 1 ∀f ∈ F (23c)
x(f, q) ∈ {0, 1} ∀f ∈ F , q ∈ Qf (23d)
Problem (23) is equivalent to problem (5) with V (f, q) = LB(f, q) for all
f ∈ F and q ∈ Qf , then it will be ZLBIP−E ≤ ZIP−E, the strict inequality
holding whenever LB(f, q) < V (f, q) for at least one request q ∈ Qf for
some flight f ∈ F . Hence all the integer (feasible) exchanges calculated by
solving the linear relaxation of problem (23) with V (f, q) = LB(f, q) and im-
plemented at prices equal to the dual variables corresponding to constraints
(23b), will guarantee individual rationality and weak budget balance, when-
ever ZLBIP−E > 0.
The solution obtained (exchanges and prices associated) is not however
a Walrasian equilibrium because at the given prices there could be some f
better-off with another exchange than the one implemented and this implies
that the solution must be somewhat forced by the central authority. Then
after a pre-determined number of iterations or a given elapsed time, if an
equilibrium cannot be found by simply alternating local optimization and
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price update (i.e. problems (20) and (19)), then the central authority can
impose the best solution calculated so far by solving the linear relaxation
of problem (23) at the dual prices, i.e. the integer solution which gives the
highest positive-value according to LB, which is the last feasible solution
obtained since LB are always updated by increasing them.
4.3.3 Markets and Sub-markets Selection
The complete procedure for TW exchanges can proceeds as it follows. The
first step is to create a partition of the grand coalition F into independent
subsets Mi ⊆ F , such that for every pair of different flights f ∈ Mi and
g ∈ Mj with i 6= j it will be Qf ∩Qg = ∅. Then each subset Mi constitutes
an independent market, since all the tradable resources will be within the
market itself.
From each of these markets Mi, depending on their dimensions smaller
sub-markets (sub-coalitions) of predetermined size |SM | can be formed and
then processed, in order to increase the probability of obtaining integer so-
lutions to the linear relaxation of problem (23), that guarantee the existence
of linear prices supporting the exchange (cf. 3.6.1).
In fact by reducing the size of the sub-markets, at the same time the
value of the optimal exchange reduces while the percentage of instances for
which ZIP−E = ZLP−E increases. This is due to the fact that by reducing the
number of flights, the constraint matrix associated with the LP relaxation of
problem (23) has higher probability of being balanced, i.e. not to contain any
square submatrix of odd order with exactly two 1’s in each row and column.
This is a sufficient condition for ZIP−E = ZLP−E (cf. Section 3.6.1.1).
By forming these sub-markets according to a criteria which first includes
flights with higher exchange potential, in few repetitions the procedure can
determine the exchanges with highest value and reach a solution that ap-
proaches the global optimum as illustrated in charts (4.3.1).
The data correspond to the average on 100 instances obtained by attach-
ing different vectors of costs drawn from the same distribution, to a fixed set
of real flight plans data, further described in Section 4.3.5. The Exchange
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Figure 4.3.1: Gap between the optimal value of the exchange in the Main
Market M1 and in Sub-markets SM .
Potential series illustrates the case in which 10 sub-markets of fixed size |SM |
are successively created from the main Market M1 in decreasing order of their
potential of exchange, while the random series corresponds to the situation
in which sub-markets are formed by including flights randomly from M1.
The optimal exchange is calculated centrally by solving the LP relaxation
of problem (5) on the sub-market SM , including only flights f ∈ SM and
the TWs currently assigned to them by either the FPFS allocation or by a
previous exchange, and then implemented. For each of the 100 instances this
procedure is repeated 10 times by forming sub-markets according to a spe-
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cific criteria (i.e. Exchange Potential series) and other 10 times by forming
sub-markets randomly (i.e. Random series).
To create sub-markets according to their potential of exchange, flights in
the Main Market M1 are first ordered from the one with the lowest to the one
with the highest assigned FPFS request, according to the rank set notation
described in Section 4.3.1. Then starting from the head of this ordered list
one flight f is selected as well as its first potential seller g starting from the
tail. A flight g is a potential seller for flight f if (i) they share at least one
resource s (Sf ∩ Sg 6= ∅) (ii) f prefers the TW k assigned to g on s than its
currently assigned one j (Ik < Ij) (iii) TW k is feasible for f (E
s
f ≤ Uk). If
no potential seller exists the flight next to f is selected together with its first
potential seller.
Only flights which have not been previously included in other sub-markets
can be selected. This limits to |M1|/|SM | the maximum number of times
that the procedure can be repeated. In the case that all flights f ∈M1 have
been selected and sub-markets are still to be created, flights at random are
included. The complete procedure is described in algorithm (2) in Appendix
A.
This procedure has been applied for iterations 1 to 3 in the cases |SM | =
80 and |SM | = 120, while it has been applied for iterations 1 to 5 in the
|SM | = 40 case.
By forming sub-markets with this procedure the exchanges attainable al-
ways give a higher global value than in the case trades occur within random
coalitions. The higher value exchanges are established during the first itera-
tions, i.e. when trades occur among flights with higher exchange potential,
while after 5 iterations only a small number of residual exchanges occur.
The number of instances which give non integer solution to the linear
relaxation of problem (5) increases with the size of the sub-market. When
|SM | = 40 on average 0.15% of cases are non integer, 3.65% when |SM | = 80
and 4.35% when |SM | = 120. In these cases the dual variables are not sup-
porting prices and one possible solution could be represented by the exchange
optimal for the integer problem (5) and the prices calculated according to
a VCG-based payment rule. Even if a competitive equilibrium with linear
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prices does not exist for such instances, our heuristic can still converge to a
solution which guarantees IR and weak BB. Once the sub-markets have been
formed according to criteria described before, the iterative Market Mecha-
nism can be applied to them.
4.3.4 Overall Description of the Iterative Market Mech-
anism
The diagram in Figure (4.3.2) represents the steps performed by the
heuristic procedure. It starts from a given FPFS allocation, that we im-
plemented through algorithm (1) in Appendix A. Independent Markets Mi
are determined and sub-markets SM are possibly selected through proce-
dure described in algorithm (2) in Appendix A. Each sub-market is then
processed by the heuristic which is configured as an iterative exchange with
demand-queries. In fact the central authority utilizes linear prices to elicit
the preferences of participants.
Individual TW prices are set equal to zero at the beginning, i.e. λ0k = 0 for
all s ∈ S, k ∈ Ls. At a subsequent general iteration t prices λtk are modified
according to the subgradient algorithm (19) as a function of the difference
between demand and capacity for each TW k, with stepsize calculated ac-
cording to formula (21). A flight demand then corresponds to the optimal
bundle q∗ such that xt(f, q∗) = 1, obtained locally by the Aircraft Operator
solving problem (18) with prices λt.
The demand of each flight f ∈ SM is then used by the central authority
to update the lower bounds on actual exchange values through formula (22)
for all bundles b ∈ Qf such that dbf < dq
∗
f . This allows the central authority
to solve the LP relaxation of problem (23) and to determine an Individual
Rational and weakly Budget Balanced exchange whenever the solution is
integral and has ZLBLP−E > 0.
In fact when ZLBLP−E > 0 it follows from the definition of lower bound
exchange values given in formula (22) that
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∑
f∈SM
∑
q∈Qf :xt(f,q)=1
∑
s∈S,k∈Ls:q3k
λtk >
∑
f∈SM
∑
s∈S,k∈Ls:af3k
λtk
and this implies weak Budget Balance.
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Figure 4.3.2: Schematics of the iterative Market Mechanism
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In the case that at a certain iteration t < MaxIter the TWs demanded
by flights constitute a capacity compliant solution, the algorithm stops and
the correspondent exchange is executed at prices λt. In the case that all unas-
signed TWs k have a price λtk = 0 the solution corresponds to a Walrasian
equilibrium, hence it is equivalent to the exchange which can be centrally
calculated by solving problem (5).
When t = MaxIter the procedure stops and the last feasible solution
centrally calculated by solving the LP relaxation of problem (23) is proposed
to users. This solution corresponds to a feasible exchange which is weakly
Budget balanced and Individual Rational, then all participants (including
the central authority) will increase their utility by implementing it. Prices
are the solutions of the problem dual to the LP relaxation of problem (23).
4.3.5 Computational Results
We simulated the iterative Market Mechanism described in previous sec-
tion on a sample of traffic retrieved from real CFMU data, relative to the
two hours period from 09:00 AM to 11:00 AM on Friday August 15th, 2008.
There were a total of 60 capacity constrained resources and 482 regulated
flights, that were clustered into 3 independent Main markets (M1, ...,M3),
with |M1| = 425,|M2| = 34,|M3| = 23. Market M1 included most of the
flights interacting directly or indirectly in the exchange of TW on 58 re-
sources, flights in M2 and only them were affected by a regulation on an
upper en-route sector (LECMDOM) in the north of Spain that was limiting
traffic flow rate to 43 entries/hour from 09:00 AM to 12:00 AM due to ATC
capacity reasons. Flights in M3 and only them competed for the assignment
of TW on an upper en route sector (LFMMW2) located in the South of
France that was closed from 10.15 AM to 11.30 AM due to ATC routing.
In this such cases, i.e. when capacity of a certain resource z ∈ S is null
for a given time period [st time; end time], we included just one TW in Lz
with I1 = end time and infinite capacity in order to make problem feasible
without rerouting (the same assumption is used in Terrab and Odoni, 1993).
For each flight f ∈ F we attached a vector cost of delay CDf ⊂ N3, where
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each component represents the per-minute cost of delay according to the
magnitude of the delay itself, which has been discretized into the three classes
[1; 15) min, [15; 45) min, [45;MaxDelf ] min. Components cdf ∈ CDf have
been randomly drawn from the uniform distribution on the three discrete
intervals:
cdf ∼

U(1; 5) e/min for df ∈ [1; 15)
U(15; 25) e/min for df ∈ [15; 45)
U(30; 105) e/min for df ∈ [45;MaxDelf ]
Graphs in Figure (4.3.3) show the results obtained by applying the itera-
tive Market Mechanism described in Section 4.3.4, where MaxDelf was fixed
for each flight such that MxRq = 200 for each flight. The value of µ in step
size formula (21) was fixed at 1.5 at the beginning and modified whenever
the value ZLB was positive and did not change for 3 consecutive iterations:
µ← µ/2 if µ ≥ 0.1, otherwise it was reinitialized to µ = 1.5.
The highest value is achieved by letting all flights f ∈ M1 participate in
a unique repetition of the mechanism (i.e. SM = M1), however the coor-
dination tasks for the central authority may become slower. In fact at each
iteration t all the optimal demands x∗ at current prices λt have to be collected
and they are likely to arrive asynchronously, depending on the computational
capabilities of the Aircraft Operator. Additionally only a small percentage of
solutions obtained by iteratively solve LP relaxation of problem (23) will give
feasible integer solutions (26% according to our simulations). This reduces
the probability of finding linear prices that support the exchange and may
demand for an alternative calculation of prices, such as the VCG-based (cf.
Section 3.6.5) thus increasing computational complexity and reducing the
transparency of the mechanism, since the prices charged would be different
from feedback prices used along mechanism’s iterations.
In all the other three cases with SM ⊂M1 the most valuable exchanges
occur within the first five repetitions of the procedure on successive sub-
markets. For the case with |SM | = 40, 90% of the final value is attained
after 4 trades series, while with |SM | = 80 and |SM | = 120 just 2 repetition
of the procedure are sufficient to achieve 95% of the final value. This is due
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Figure 4.3.3: Value of the exchanges obtained through the iterative mecha-
nism on several Sub-Markets
to the highest number of exchanges which becomes possible by increasing the
sizes of coalitions and it is a prove that remarkable cost savings are achievable
also by employing a decentralized heuristic market mechanism.
We employed Xpress Mosel v.3.0.0 to code the heuristic procedure and
Xpress Optimizer version 20.00.05 to solve all the linear problems. The result
figures obtained regarding the cost savings achievable for Aircraft Operators
by implementing exchanges are fairly high, especially if we consider that our
traffic sample is relative to a 2 hours period. However they represent less
than 20% of the total cost of delay originally caused by the FPFS allocation,
which equals 740187 e, for the 12989 min of ground delay assigned to flights
according to the our algorithm. This figure cannot match exactly the real
one computed by the CFMU CASA procedure, due to the differences in both
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the behaviors of the algorithms and the environment of application, which is
highly dynamical and influenced by many external factors (e.g. cancellations,
reroutings, ecc.) in the real world. However this result is perfectly in line with
the figures estimated by EUROCONTROL Performance Review Commission
(2009), which attribute to direct and reactionary ATFM delays an aggregated
cost of 1.5 ·109 efor year 2008, which correspond to an average cost of about
400000 e/hour if we consider a daily regulated time horizon of 10 hours.
EUROCONTROL Performance Review Commission (2009) takes an average
cost of delay of 63 e/min equal for all flights, while we simulated all flights
with associated their individual costs of delay, in line with figures provided
in Cook et al. (2004). The average cost of delay produced by our simulation
is 57 e/min.
Graphs in the following figures illustrates the course of the exchanges for
three Sub-market sizes, in which we have fixed the cost vector CDf for all
flights to a single random generated instance. The blue line indicates the true
cumulative value of the exchange obtained by the heuristic at the correspon-
dent iteration, while the pink line indicates the correspondent lower bound
value centrally calculated by solving problem (23). The subgradient proce-
dure never converged to a capacity feasible solution, however it constituted
an efficient algorithm for the pricing problem.
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Since lower bounds on individual exchanges’ values are always adjusted
upwards, the global value ZLBIP−E describes a non-decreasing trajectory
until the final value. The true value instead is generally growing but can
locally register a decrease during some iteration with respect to the previous
iteration, giving a negative relative difference which is not registered by the
correspondent LB value. This process of finding the high values exchanges
and relative prices could be further fastened if the participants were allowed
to update lower bounds not just through their demands bu also by explicitly
set tighter values according to their internal estimates. The case |SM | = 40
ahows the slowest rate of ascent, in fact by stopping the procedure after 100
iterations we get 72% of the value achievable after 150 iterations. In the
other cases even by stopping prematurely the procedure we get most of the
value: with |SM | = 80 and |SM | = 120 the mechanism reaches 90% of the
final value within the firs 100 iterations, while in the case |SM | = 425 100%
of the final value is reached after the first 94 iterations.
It is hard to provide an estimate of the time required by a real imple-
mentation of the mechanism, however it is arguable that by employing a fast
communication network as the one provided by SWIM (cf. Section 2.5.2.2)
and by automating the Airline interfaces through a proxy for the computa-
tion of demands, each iteration will require a time in the order of 5 to 10
seconds, then in less than 30 minutes the most valuable exchanges could be
calculated and implemented.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The Air Traffic Flow Management is the complex task of regulating air
traffic in order to ensure that the available capacity of the system resources
is always respected and used efficiently. In order to achieve this objective,
ground delays are systematically imposed to flights which are foreseen to
cross congested resources, in order to avoid airborne delays.
The impact of ATFM delays on the costs experienced by airspace users
(prevalently commercial Airlines) under the current system is non-negligible,
in particular due to the First-Planned-First-Served allocation policy em-
ployed today to assign delays to flights, which does not take into account
individual users’ preferences. This system is likely to be modified under the
new paradigm-shift proposed by SESAR for the management of air traffic
in Europe in the forthcoming years. According to the SESAR Target Con-
cept, users will be fully involved in the process of demand-capacity balancing
through the implementation of ad-hoc collaborative mechanisms that will al-
low them to cooperatively elaborate solutions that best match their internal
business objectives.
This thesis formalizes and analyzes a number of auction-based models and
mechanisms that could be employed to assign ATFM resources to competing
flights. A key assumption is that both the utility derived by the resource
assignment and the cost for achieving it are measured in monetary units and
users can transfer this utility among them by adopting proper exchanges.
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This assumption implies that there are two types of goods in the resource
allocation setting considered: the first is the limited capacity represented by
particular resources called Target Windows (TW) and the second is money.
Theoretical results prove that a market equilibrium, representing the op-
timal solution to the underlying problem, can be guaranteed only under
particular conditions that make strong assumptions on the type of users’
preferences or on the number of constrained resources or on the structure of
prices adopted. Hence an heuristic approach has been undertaken to develop
a specific Market Mechanism for the exchange of resources that responds to
a number of practical requirements.
This mechanism has been successfully tested on a real sample of traffic
data with related costs of delay drawn from a Uniform distribution, in line
with reference Cook et al. (2004). All the mathematical models routinely
employed by the Mechanism remain linear even if costs of delay experienced
by individual flights are non-linear. This is due to the particular formulation
of the problem as a combinatorial exchange, that has been shown to be
computationally tractable on real instances and to enable the elaboration of
good solutions in acceptable times.
The resulting Market Mechanism leverages some of the underlying prop-
erties of the specific problem, such as its separability into smaller problems
which are locally solvable by airspace users and the characterization of the
costs as a non-decreasing function of delays, to determine exchanges of re-
sources among users which are Individual Rational and weakly Budget Bal-
ance. These properties imply that all participants as well as the central
authority are guaranteed to experience a non negative profit by participat-
ing into the mechanism than by accepting the baseline FPFS solution. These
features, together with its de-centralized nature and privacy preservation of
users’ confidential information, make it a good candidate for the adoption as
a tactical tool for TW exchanges on a pre-operational phase.
It appears from the results that remarkable cost savings are possible for
Aircraft Operators if they were offered the possibility to actively participate
in the sequencing of flights imposed by capacity restrictions. Equity is guar-
anteed by taking as a baseline solution the one obtained by applying a FPFS
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priority rule. This sequencing principle is the same adopted under the cur-
rent ATFM system but it is extended to provide an explicit assignment of
multiple TWs on all capacity constrained resources crossed by a flight. This
allows Airspace Users to engage in an effective exchange mechanism that
permits to considerably reduce their delay-related costs, while at the same
time ensuring the respect of capacity constraints.
The introduction of the TW concept presented in the CATS project (cf.
Section 2.5.3), constitutes a fundamental tool to achieve CDM capabilities
comparable to those already implemented under the U.S. ATFM system. In
fact the higher complexity of the European setting deriving from a systematic
occurrence of combined en-route and airport regulations, does not allow the
direct adoption of CDM mechanisms such as Compression and Slot Credit
Substitution (cf. Section 2.3.2.1), which give users high control capabilities
on the management of ATFM delays.
At the same time the iterative Market Mechanism prevents the disclo-
sure of users’ private information by being decentralized and letting users
make independent decisions based on their internal business objectives and
according to the value attached by other users to individual TWs on capac-
ity constrained resources. This is in-line with the SESAR target concept
(Section 2.5.2) which demand for new methods and tools to manage air traf-
fic flows, that have to respond to a number of requirements in several Key
Performance Areas.
While several pricing rules are possible for the combinatorial exchange
problem, it seems that a linear one that assigns a price to each TW is the
most effective and permits to reach a solution in a vast majority of instances.
By explicitly trading individual TWs, possibly bundled in packages, the cen-
tral authority can assess the value implicitly attached by participants, thus
effectively eliciting their preferences. This can provide a baseline for assess-
ing incentive schemes or penalties mechanisms when it comes to tactically
enforce the respect of TWs previously traded.
Additionally the dynamic nature of the iterative Market Mechanism pro-
posed makes it suitable for being employed continuously on a rolling horizon
basis, since a flight could join it few hours before the take-off, in correspon-
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dence to the current Slot Issue Time (cf. Section 2.3.1), and left either when
a satisfying exchange occurs or at a fixed time before its original FPFS as-
signed TW. However this constitute an extension of the mechanism described
in Section 4.3.4, that is worth of being further analyzed and simulated.
Another interesting extension of the mechanism could be constituted by
including TWs of variable duration, whose price can modify depending on
their time extension. This concept should be first validated from the safety
perspective, since it implies a new definition of capacity. Rather all the
models exposed in this thesis are based on the same definition of capacity
adopted under the current ATFM system.
Appendix A
Algorithms
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Algorithm 1 Implement First-Planned-First-Served allocation of flight re-
quests
1: Input: Set of flights F , set of resources crossed Sf ∀f ∈ F , set of
requests Qf ∀f ∈ F , set of resources S, slot allocation list Ls ∀s ∈ S,
estimated time over Esf ∀f ∈ F , s ∈ Sf
2: for all f ∈ F do
3: provalloc(f)← 0
4: end for
5: while AllProcessed = FALSE do
6: for all s ∈ S do
7: Ep← sort flights f crossing s by increasing Esf
8: for all f ∈ Ep do
9: if provalloc(f) = 0 then
10: provalloc(f)← AssignFirstFeasible(f, s, 1)
11: processed(f, s)← TRUE
12: else if processed(f, s) = FALSE then
13: if IsFeasible(provalloc(f), f, s) = TRUE then
14: processed(f, s)← TRUE
15: else
16: for all z ∈ Sf : z 6= s do
17: processed(f, z)← FALSE
18: end for
19: provalloc(f)← AssignFirstFeasible(f, s, provalloc(f))
20: processed(f, s)← TRUE
21: end if
22: end if
23: end for
24: end for
25: end while
26: noimprovement← FALSE
27: while noimprovement = FALSE do
28: noimprovement← TRUE
29: for all f ∈ F do
30: for all q ∈ Qf , s ∈ Sf : q < provalloc(f) do
31: if IsFeasible(q, f, s) = TRUE then
32: provalloc(f)← q
33: noimprovement← FALSE
34: break
35: end if
36: end for
37: end for
38: end while
39: for all f ∈ F do
40: af ← provalloc(f)
41: end for
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The function AllProcessed returns TRUE if processed(f, s) = 1 for all
f ∈ F , s ∈ Sf and FALSE otherwise.
The function AssignFirstFeasible(f, s, k) returns the first requests q in
k...MxRqf such that TWi ∈ q has not been assigned to another flight or that
was assigned to another flight g with Esg > E
s
f . In this latter case flight g
becomes status is modified to processed(g, s)← FALSE. In the worst case,
i.e. no TW is available for flight f , it is assigned its last request qw ∈ Qf .
The function IsFeasible(q, f, s) returns TRUE if TWs ∈ q for flight f has
not been assigned to any other flight and FALSE otherwise.
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Algorithm 2 Select sub-market SM with fixed size |SM | = K
Input: Main market M1, sub-market size K, rank set corresponding to
the FPFS assignment R = (r1, ..., rF ) such that Qf (rf ) = af ∀f ∈ F
2: sort flights f ∈M1 by decreasing rf
SM ← ∅
4: i← 0
while |SM | < K do
6: g ←M1(i)
sg ← findseller(g)
8: if exists(g) = TRUE AND exists(sg) = TRUE then
if hastraded(g) = FALSE then
10: SM ← SM ∪ {g}
if |SM | < K then
12: SM ← SM ∪ {sg}
end if
14: end if
i← i+ 1
16: else if exists(g) = TRUE AND exists(sg) = FALSE then
if i < |M1| then
18: i← i+ 1
else
20: while |SM | < K do
SM ← random(M1)
22: end while
end if
24: else if exists(g) = FALSE then
while |SM | < K do
26: SM ← random(M1)
end while
28: end if
for all f ∈ SM do
30: hastraded(f)← TRUE
end for
32: end while
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The function findseller(f) returns the first potential seller for flight f ,
if there is one, otherwise it returns a random flight. A flight g is a potential
seller for flight f if (i) they share at least one resource s (Sf ∩ Sg 6= ∅) (ii) f
prefers the slot k assigned to g on s than its currently assigned one j (Ik < Ij)
(iii) slot k is feasible for f (Esf ≤ Uk).
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Appendix B
Discussion on Incentive
Compatibility
This appendix provides a simple example where a flight may find con-
venient to misrepresent its true cost of delay to increase its payoff, at the
expense of other flights, in the simple case of a unique capacity constrained
resource s.
Consider two flights, f1 and f2, and two TWs, a and b. Both flights
request TW a. Then we set C(f1, a) = C(f2, b) = 0. We assume that
0 < C(f1, b) < C(f2, b) and that E
s
f1
< Esf2 . The FPFS policy allocates
flight f1 at TW a and flight f2 at TW b. Let r(f1) and r(f2) be the profits of
flight f1 and f2, respectively, obtained by selling its FPFS TW and purchas-
ing the other one. We finally assume that flights do not know the costs of
delay of each other and that the optimal exchange is centrally calculated by
solving problem (3). We want to investigate the opportunity for flight f1 to
cheat about its true cost of delay to get a higher profit. Let Cˆ(f1, b) be the
false value of the delay cost displayed by flight f1 for TW b, and p
′(a), p′(b)
and r′(f1) be the corresponding modified TW prices and profit for flight f1,
respectively.
Flight f1 (resp. f2) has a nonnegative profit in selling its TW a (resp. b)
and purchasing the other TW b (resp. a) at prices p(a) (resp. p(b)) and p(b)
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(resp. p(a)). In particular,
r(f1) = C(f1, a)− C(f1, b) + p(a)− p(b)
r(f2) = C(f2, b)− C(f2, a) + p(b)− p(a)
where p(a) and p(b) are the optimal solutions of the following problem (4):
minZ = u(f1) + u(f2) + p(a) + p(b)
u(f1) + p(a) ≥ 0
u(f1) + p(b) ≥ C(f1, a)− C(f1, b)
u(f2) + p(a) ≥ 0
u(f2) + p(b) ≥ C(f2, b)− C(f2, a)
p(a), p(b) ≥ 0
In the (p(a), p(b)) space the optimal region is C(f1, b)−C(f1, a) ≤ p(a)−
p(b) ≤ C(f2, a) − C(f2, b). This optimal region has only two finite ver-
tices, i.e., (p(a) = C(f1, b) − C(f1, a), p(b) = 0) and (p(a) = C(f2, a) −
C(f2, b), p(b) = 0). Using a standard algorithm, as the simplex or the dual
simplex algorithm to solve the problem, the optimal solution is always point
(p(a) = C(f1, b)− C(f1, a), p(b) = 0). Hence the profit of flight f1 in selling
its TW a at price p(a) = C(f1, b) − C(f1, a) and purchasing the TW b at
price p(b) = 0 is r(f1) = 0− C(f1, b) + C(f1, b)− 0 = 0.
As long as Cˆ(f1, b) ≤ C(f2, b) the TW allocation remains the same
and the optimal solution obtained by the simplex algorithm is (pˆ(a) =
Cˆ(f1, b)− Cˆ(f1, a), pˆ(b) = 0). Hence the modified profit is rˆ(f1) = C(f1, a)−
C(f1, b) + Cˆ(f1, b)− Cˆ(f1, a). Then rˆ(f1)− r(f1) = Cˆ(f1, b)−C(f1, b). Then
if 0 ≤ Cˆ(f1, b) < C(f1, b) it follows that rˆ(f1)− r(f1) < 0, and if C(f1, b) <
Cˆ(f1, b) < C(f2, b) we have rˆ(f1) − r(f1) > 0. When Cˆ(f1, b) > C(f2, b),
the TW assignment changes and becomes identical to the FPFS allocation.
Hence in this case rˆ(f1) = 0.
As the value C(f2, b) is not known to flight f1, we conclude that the flight
taking the first TW under the FPFS allocation knows that it does not have to
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display a false delay cost lower that the true one because this choice may lead
to a profit rˆ(f1) lower than the true profit r(f1). On the other side, if this
flight f1 communicates to the central authority a false delay cost Cˆ(f1, b)
higher than the true one, the profit rˆ(f1) it gets is higher than or equal
to the true profit r(f1). Then the mechanism is not incentive compatible
because there is no disadvantage for the first flight in the FPFS allocation
to appropriately misrepresent its delay costs.
However these findings assume that we know in advance which is the
vertex of the optimal region of problem (4) chosen by the solving algorithm.
On the contrary, when we consider as TW prices a generic pair of optimal
values (p(A), p(B)) the corresponding profit r(f1) can be strictly positive,
as the mechanism is by construction individual rational. In this situation, it
can be risky for flight f1 to cheat about its cost of delay C(f1, b). In fact,
if it sets its false value Cˆ(f1, b) strictly larger then C(f2, b) its profit rˆ(f1) is
equal to 0. Since C(f2, b) is unknown to flight f1, a misrepresentation of its
cost of delay may produce a profit rˆ(f1) lower than the true r(f1).
Hence when one does not know in advance which are the optimal TW
prices, it is impossible to identify up to which limit a false value of the delay
cost does not lead to a profit rˆ(f1) < r(f1).
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